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Abstract 
This thesis undertakes an examination of theories describing the generation of meaning in 
various forms of representation, with specific reference to literary texts, photography and 
cinema. Proceeding from Derrida's claim that all signification may be classed as a 
general form of Writing, I consider the consequences of analysing the individual forms of 
representation from within a general system. 
The classical representation of self-presence in speech is examined, and the 
metaphysical notions derived from the apparent proximity of voice to thought, on the 
basis of instantaneous production, are challenged. As a result, the claims regarding 
presence and atemporality in the analogical representation of the photograph and the 
motion picture projection are critically examined; and the closure of mediation and 
meaning in the speech/writing and author/text hierarchies is subjected to deconstructionist 
analysis. Text theory often acknowledges Lacanian psychoanalysis, and Lacan's theory 
of the signification of desire is evaluated for its relationship to traditional models of 
representation. The Lacanian influence in Barthes's work is traced through the notion of 
textual desire developed in SIZ, and Barthes's claims regarding the meaning of myth and 
code are examined for their erasure of textual mediation. 
With the conclusion that claims to "truth" and the original encounter of 
"presence" in representation are founded on erasure and the privileging of secondary 
phenomena, the thesis incorporates examples of texts, such as Desperately Seeking 
Susan, which evoke the traditionally elided material; because the label "feminine" is 
usually applied to the excluded features of representation, the contemporary work in this 
area often takes a feminist approach, challenging the phallogocentric tradition of Western 
society. 
1.1. Introduction 
1 
The Nature of 
Representation 
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The classical understanding of representation is based upon substitution, in which the 
representative presence replaces and maintains the presence of the original, absent entity. 
Similarly, the everyday use of the term representation implies the substitution of an 
original entity for another which is equivalent to, or derived from, the original; the 
representative gains its identity from the original and exists only while the original does. 
For example, the electorate is substituted in the parliamentary arena for the political 
representative on the basis of their similar concerns and priorities; artistic representation is 
generally expected to reproduce the sensation of the reality depicted and provide a 
"window" to the absent scene. The verbal or written description is often expected to 
replace the experience of the actual event, and the well chosen representation, it is 
believed, may evoke or relay the particular emotional experience of the author or artist to 
the subject. Representation is a common event in social and textual discourse; however, 
the classical suppositions about the respective natures and the similarity between 
substitute and original implicitly raise questions of actual identity when representations 
are formulated, and in some cases parties represented may object to the implicit statement 
that their identity is the origin of the representation. 
The nature of representation, as a secondary phenomenon, implies that it has an 
origin, and since the origin is posited as an autonomous plenitude, classical 
representation has attempted to ensure the faithfulness of the secondary copy to the 
primary original. The strategy most commonly used is the elision of the mediation, either 
through a privileged context or through the use of a medium which is considered to 
present minimal distortion. Context and medium are implicitly connected, as in the 
spoken utterance. To enhance the validity of the representation of significant concepts, 
such as "truth," motifs are relied upon, as in the case of "the woman." The erasure of 
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mediation evoked by such motifs derives from the inherent meaning they are believed to 
embody, however, the meaning is merely the displaced context of the relationship of 
desire between the oppositional categories of masculine and feminine. That is, the 
position of the feminine Other is connoted as identical to the position of "truth" as the 
other of representation, so an essentialist closure is placed on the representation of 
femininity. The validity of the transparent motif may be questioned if the origin is 
posited as a secondary phenomenon itself, having no independent existence outside the 
differential realm of representation. The nature of representation may be considered as 
that which erases itself by appearing to conceal its origin and presenting itself as a 
secondary phenomenon. The differential system of signification supports this 
hypothesis, and I examine various claims relating to the transparency of mediation, in 
order to determine the complicity between the mediation of representation and the creation 
of the origin. 
The "woman" in film and literature is often represented as an object of spectacle, and 
the female body is presented as the site where the essence of sexuality is readily apparent. 
I place quotation marks in reference to "the woman" as an indication that the term is a 
figure which has significance within the system of Western philosophy. However, 
tracing the term to a referent is an essentialising closure, since the textual function is the 
erasure of the mediation on the basis that "the woman" is an example providing 
metaphorical transparency, in relation to logocentric discourse. Derrida's observations 
on the significance of supplementary presence are incorporated in the following analysis, 
which focusses on the scene of representation and the critical acknowledgement or 
ellipsis of the mediation of the signified. All names adhere to Western metaphysics (as I 
discuss in this chapter), however, the representation of women extends its essentialist 
motif into arts, literature and Western values in general. The displacement of the name of 
"the woman" in the context of representation and the erasure of mediation is significant in 
relation to the nature of the text representing the figure, and the nature of the claims made 
through "the woman" as if the context were not one of representation. Meaning, and 
therefore the meaning of "the woman," is treated as something which is a secondary 
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representation in the text, rather than as something which is intrinsically dependent on 
representation for the possibility of its origination. The textual representation further 
excludes women artists and authors from the site of artist production, on the critical 
grounds that their relationship to the Symbolic nature of the signified is secondary. I 
discuss the work of some women artists who challenge the traditional models of artistic 
production in the context of the subjective presence within the work. 
Traditional concepts of plot and narrative explain textual representation as though it 
were subject to real causality in a spatio-temporal continuum, while the signified's 
differential origin denies the referent an originary position. The representation of desire 
in the text often privileges masculine heterosexual desire as the impetus of narrative 
development, yet conclusions drawn from Lacan's account of desire in language and 
Barthes's investigation of the realist novel suggest that the sign is detached from the 
origin of the message and has no direct relationship with a central meaning. The semiotic 
system supported by Western philosophy is examined below, along with the description 
of the process of signification which erases the text from the scene of representation and 
treats meaning as a self-present feature of representation. 
1.2. The Original Plenitude 
The notion that representation is substitution implies the existence of an original object, 
which motivates the form of the substitute. The process of substitution implicitly holds 
that the substitute is different from that which is absent, and that it defers the moment of 
encounter with the thing represented. The representation is therefore the sign of the 
original object, and as Derrida notes, the representation effected by the sign in classical 
semiology is "both secondary and provisional" (1982a, 9): the secondariness results from 
its derivation from the lost presence, and it is provisional because the sign is a movement 
toward the missing presence. For the classical sign to replace the missing presence, the 
original and the substitute must have in essence similar qualities, therefore, there is 
continuity between the substitute and the absent entity, and they may be described as the 
same, yet different. 
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The substitution of the original is a form of repetition, because the object is being 
re-presented, yet, repetition can only proliferate presence through reference to an original 
entity, if the classical representation is to remain genuine. The repetition is an operation 
of supplementation which "is not exhibited as a break in presence, but rather as a 
reparation and a continuous, homogeneous modification of presence in representation" 
(Derrida 1982a, 313). This explanation allows the original object to repeat itself, within 
itself, in sending out a representation, and claims that signification is produced by the 
relationship of sign to referent, rather than by the differential structure of the sign. The 
original plenitude can only be categorised as an autonomous presence if the substitution 
in representation is modelled on an active process, emanating from a primary source; 
otherwise, allowing the sign an independent presence as mediator would disrupt the 
theoretical continuity of presence between the sign and referent, and imply that the 
referent passively receives its identity from the sign. 
Derrida takes up the classical notion of representation as sending out, and examines 
the behaviour of the representative, using examples such as the envoy, emissary, and 
political delegation which maintain contact with their origins by sending back reports 
(1982b, 324); and strategically using, as that issued in representation, the term envoi, 
with its multiple connotations of "sending," "signing off," and "urgent dispatch," he 
introduces as the return to the original, renvoi, which is also the term for the footnoting 
of the text. The footnote does not direct the reader to an original source, but may 
proliferate diverse points of origin which are brought together by the text, which has no 
authority over them and where they do not appear with a representative structure (Derrida 
1982b, 324); that is, the text which is proposed as a continuous modification of presence 
is subjected to differentiation and deferral of autonomy in the footnote, so the renvois are 
excluded from what is termed the representative nature of the text. The footnote is an 
explicit case of the property of all representation, that is, the meaning and authority 
conveyed by the representative are derived from other forms of representation rather than 
an original plenitude; the authority of each text is dispersed among those to which it 
refers, and those other texts also depend on other texts, so the difference and deferral of 
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final authoritative presence results in the text's becoming part of the chain of meaning, 
without dependence on an ultimate, primary text. The empirical existence of the footnote 
in a text does not alter the text's status, it is the possi bility of the footnoting dissemination 
which causes the text's autonomy to be established and negated, in a self-effacing 
operation. The autonomy of the text, which is ascertained through its difference from 
other texts, represents the erasure of the other texts from its structure. A similar 
effacement is observed by Saussure in the autonomy of the sign. 
Saussure defines the sign as both arbitrary and differential, concluding that "in 
language there are only differences without positive terms" (1959, 120). Representation 
derived from the sign deferring the presence of the missing object is proved a 
misconception, since the signified of the sign is differentially determined by other signs, 
and the referent is only arbitrarily linked to the sign. Saussure envisages the sign as a 
unity, but states that the substance of the sign is of less importance than the surrounding 
signs; from this, Derrida concludes that the signified concept must be denied an 
independent presence "in and of itself" (1982a, 11), because it is a site which depends on 
its surrounding terms without a fixed identity inside or outside the signifying system. 
Saussure attributes the original possibility of signification to the voice, and places writing 
in a supplementary relationship with speech, demonstrating the classical notion that the 
sign is a supplement to the original. Derrida finds that difference and deferral have their 
effect not just within the unified, meaningful sign but in the possibility of signification 
itself, and he describes the effect that allows signification, dljferance, not as a concept 
which may be applied to a system, but as the effect of the system. 
1.3. Truth in Representation 
Differance is not a concept, and cannot be applied in teleological fashion to allow 
deductions toward a theological truth. The use of differance to explain representation 
cannot result in the replacement of essentialist representation with a new, more truthful 
form because the form of truth already established by Western philosophy is the result of 
the differential system. The effacement of the mediation of the signifier "is the condition 
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of the very idea of truth" (Derrida 1976, 20), and leads to the association of truth and 
presence on the basis of the erasure of their founding principle (differance). By 
examining the representation of truth within Western metaphysics, and recognising the 
sign as the effect of difference and deferral, the absolute value of truth as a theological 
entity may be refuted. Representation is only possible through the sign, so the 
representation which aims to avoid imposing essentialist definitions is restricted to 
utilising the established economy of presence to raise questions about identity and 
difference. 
Post-structuralist criticism of traditional textual practice does not result in a new 
economy of the text, but may re-align the reader's expectations. Barthes suggests that the 
reader becomes the new site of the text's meaning, as meaning is constructed in the 
writerly reading. The text presenting a multiplicity of readings is non-representational, in 
the classical sense, because it attempts no closure and encourages the slippage of the 
signifier, and the text's emphasis on the sign as the site of representation, and not the 
transference from a primary source, is anti-essentialist, although the reader who strives to 
create essentialising closure is always liable to do so. The closed, essentialist text is a 
product of critical practice, not the system of signification which depends on difjerance, 
and alternative critical practice is equally important with alternative textual practice. 
Barthes's reading of Balzac in S/Z questions the locus of meaning in the reader's 
encounter with the text, and distinguishes between reading which places arbitrary 
limitations on the text's signification and the inherently writerly aspect of all reading, 
which acknowledges the openness of the signifying chain. The textual examples from 
film and literature in the following sections are selected to demonstrate various forms of 
textual closure, with some examples of the erasure of mediation which co-erces the reader 
into accepting the closure that Western philosophy requires for the stability of its values. 
These values are implicit in various social products, film and literature, for example. The 
web of intertextual forms provides a complex stmcture which cannot easily be recast, and 
in its institutionally entrenched form may displace itself to appropriate the activity which 
attempts to situate itself outside the discursive norms; however, the potential for change 
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does exist or new critical fornls would never develop to challenge the institution. I 
examine some of the directions in which change may proceed in the work of women 
artists, such as Kolbowski and Sherman, who challenge the patriarchal exclusion of 
women from textual production, in the general sense. The patriarchal closure of meaning 
naturalises the artistic signified in "the woman," and the autonomous activity of women 
artists threatens the traditional legitimacy which the figure of "the woman" conveys to the 
topic of the work. 
1.4. Presence and Absence 
Before discussing instances of the textual economy of representation, the metaphysical 
framework that inscribes the subject with presence, and supports the binary opposition 
within which the sign is hierarchically divided as speech and writing, is examined. The 
following is a summary of the claims examined in this section. The representation of the 
subject in Western philosophy constructs the presence which representation mediates, 
and this presence is realised in the cogito. The presence of the self must be irreducible 
for its acceptance by Western thought, and because the cogito depends on the mediation 
of the sign, the sign is appropriated in its spoken form as that nearest the interior essence 
of the subject. The resulting division of speech and writing is part of the system of 
opposition which represents entities through binary categories based on the certainty of 
presence in the subject; representation is traditionally motivated to provide substitution on 
the presumption that an original essence exists and can be deferred through the sign. The 
following description of the sign will provide a challenge to concepts of the 
supplementary nature of representation and the original plenitude; and examine the 
aspects of representation which are erased in the derivation of the signified's origin. 
The differential presence of Saussure's signified is identified through its difference 
from the surrounding signifieds, and in its comprising part of the chain of signifieds, 
where its identity is deferred through the differential chain. Deferral does not occur in 
relation to a primary presence; rather, deferral is at the "origin" of the presence, so the 
sign is not a secondary phenomenon. Derrida terms the dynamic of constitution and 
division spacing (1982a, 13), and explains that it allows the formulation of presence as 
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something in its own right only to show that each presence represents the exclusion of 
numerous other presences from its "independent" presence, and each is divided between 
representing itself and representing the absence of what it excludes from its own identity. 
Spacing undermines the assumptions derived from the binary model of presence and 
absence, and divides "all that is thought on the basis of presence" (1982a, 13), such as 
the presence which isolates consciousness in the cogito. 
1.4.1. The Temporal Presence 
The signified presence provides the basis on which the concept of time as that which is 
outside the present is founded. The representation which elides its own mediation in the 
temporal aspect of its production, such as mainstream cinema, utilises the continuous 
production of signifieds to achieve the elision by emulating the production of meaning in 
speech. The letter is exteriorised because it forms a remainder outside the origin of its 
inscription, and the origin of its inscription is a by-product of the signified itself, 
produced in the context of the present. The "now" of the present is the transcendental 
form of presence which exteriorises temporality, and which is labelled as the form of 
presence which becomes past, while retaining the singularity of its event. For example, 
the signature marks and retains the signer's "having-been present in a past now, which 
will remain a future now, and therefore in a now in general, in the transcendental form of 
nowness" (Derrida 1982a, 328). 
The temporal nature of the photograph may be related to the motion picture as the 
letter is to the phoneme, yet the authenticity of the photographic signified is generally not 
questioned in the manner to which the letter is subjected. The purity of the photograph is 
derived from the analogical nature of the recording which elides the production of the 
recorded instant, so the image is accepted to mediate a past "now," but the authenticity of 
the self-contained, single inscribed moment is not challenged. The derivation of classical 
models of representation may be traced to the following description of the privileging of 
the voice, and the notion of consciousness as presence present to itself in speech. The 
privileging of the voice is complicit not onl y with the thinking of time on the basis of the 
present, but also the notion of truth as that which may be unveiled, as in the "pure" 
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experience of presence in the veiling signifier. 
The distribution of temporality around the conception of the present is an effect of 
spacing, which Derrida labels as the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of 
space (1982a, 8); and in the phonetic chain, where the distribution of phonemes is 
continuous but also discontinuous as a series of individual presences, the separation of 
each phoneme by space and time is possible through space and time being divided by 
each other. The representation of time in the graphic signifier is the blank: dividing each 
letter from the other, and the inaudible distinction between acoustic signifiers is the 
temporal form of the spacing of the graphic elements on the page; therefore, "the pure 
phonic chain, to the extent that it implies differences, is itself not a pure continuum or 
flow of time" (Derrida 1978, 219), which requires time to be thought "differently." 
Representation gains its temporal inscription from the presence that constitutes the 
signified differentially, rather than in the closure of pure presence. 
The temporality of the cinematic event provides the site from which to refute the 
self-presence of the represented presence, through intervention in the production of the 
signified's origin. The cinematic representation, like that of the voice, is present within 
the moment of its production, however, cinema, being visual and aural, may represent 
distinct origins for the signified presence because the origin of production cannot be 
traced back through the voice to the subject's conscious presence. The example 
presented in the film section to demonstrate this claim comes from Desperately Seeking 
Susan, in which the visual representation of Madonna as the character Susan conflicts 
with the acoustic representation of Madonna as Madonna in the song, "Into the Groove." 
The non-simple signified in the present origin of production, in the context of Desperately 
Seeking Susan, allows the traditional erasure of mediation in film, through the analogical 
recording of the signified, to be called into question. 
Signification is the effect when the signified, isolated by Western philosophy as an 
independent presence, is internally divided by the absence which it exteriorises by 
defining its autonomy. The classical concept of presence persists in general thought, 
both because the material presence of the signifier provides a site which paradoxically 
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hides differance by displaying the result of its effect in material form, and because the 
letter, the signifier most subject to the question of temporality, is repressed. The letter, 
capable of sustaining its presence in past, present and future, is categorised as a 
derivative of the fleeting, almost atemporal form of the spoken phoneme, because the 
presence of the speaking subject is guaranteed by the utterance's immediacy, so the 
written letter is exteriorised to maintain the purity of the phoneme. Derrida explains that 
the form of the sign is perceived only when veiled, in the erasure of the absence dividing 
the presence of the signified, and that the present in which the signified is grasped is the 
trace that permits the sign to be presented but which is "never as it is in the presentation 
of itself" (1982a, 23). 
1.4.2. The General Scene of Writing 
Derrida illustrates the internal division which the temporal sign hides, by presenting 
"writing under erasure," formulated by Heidegger, as the first writing: "it is effaced while 
still remaining legible, is destroyed while making visible the very idea of the sign" (1976, 
23). The material signifier, waiting "to be deciphered otherwise" (Derrida 1982a, 24), is 
hierarchised and the voice appropriated as transparent medium, while the letter is afflicted 
with the stigma of secondary mediation. Western philosophy, in its platonist tradition, 
perceives thought and writing as opposing elements in a nature/culture division, 
respectively. The distrust of the "exteriority of writing in general" tarnishes the spoken 
word through its association with the temporal and mechanical textual inscription, and 
Plato's attempt to separate the pure, internal thought of the subject from the external, 
"literal" writing by labeling it "metaphorical" brings the two closer together, maintaining 
the exterior sense for the definition of the interior sense (Derrida 1976, 14-15). To 
ensure itself an avenue of pure communication, Western philosophy recognises within 
the spoken sign a sponaneity, maintaining the proximity between signified and thought, 
and therefore freeing the voice from the mediation of the signifier outside its own 
inception. Of Grammatology shows that there is no linguistic sign not already formed 
from the possibility of its occurrence in graphic form, and in demonstrating this the 
interior/exterior opposition of literal to metaphorical (thought) writing is refuted, leading 
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Derrida to challenge the identity of self, in the cogito, based on the subject beholding its 
own signified. 
1.4.3. The Context of Consciousness 
Drawing on Heidegger's observation that Being is constituted within the conceptual 
framework of presence, Derrida finds that the definition of consciousness as the 
"perception of self in presence" (1982a, 16) implies that the concept of consciousness is 
held under the closure of the present. Since self-presence is grasped in the presence of 
the signified, hiding differance which defeats the concept of the independent presence, 
the subject's essence is intrinsically founded on the presence divided by the difference 
and deferral of the signifying chain. The absolute self-presence of Descartes' cogito is 
simply a presence confirming the self-effacing trace of differance manifested in the 
signified present. The essence within the subject is manifested as the presence of the 
signified, and since Saussure demonstrates that "language is not a function of the 
speaking subject" (1959, 37), the essence is thereby determined through the erasure of 
the mediation of the sign. The relationship between Being and presence is one in which 
the site of mediation is indeterminable, since each cannot be determined from outside the 
context of the other. The effect of the indeterminacy is not simply accidental, Derrida 
concludes. Rather, it is the effect of the veiling of the trace of differance, and in the 
following sections the metaphysical implications of the veiling are examined in various 
theories of representation; not in order to move outside the closure of presence, but to 
demonstrate that "differance remains a metaphysical name, and all the names that it 
receives in our language are still, as names, metaphysical" (Derrida 1982a, 26). 
1.5. The Closure of Representation 
Saussure demonstrates that signification is produced in the differential signifying chain, 
but his analysis erases the full context of representation. The limitation of an individual 
form of representation to a theoretically determined context subjects the signified to the 
closure of truth, in the belief that an ultimate and interior meaning may be found. 
Saussure attributes signification to the force of pure phonetic speech, effecting closure in 
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the tenn phonetic, from which the letter is separated; and erased from the dynamics of the 
system, the letter is then recalled as a descriptive supplement in the textual representation 
of the differential phoneme. Derrida cites the supplementary position of the letter in 
Saussure as a demonstration that closure always has a remainder; and he notes in general 
that the remainder may be used as the site from which to challenge the notion of the 
closed, autonomous entity. 
The binary model of presence and absence, as opposite and independent categories, 
is based on closure, which Derrida challenges for its erasure of the interdependence of 
each category. Saussure creates binary closure when describing the signified as the 
presence of meaning in the sign; he posits an arbitrary and differential system of 
signification, although he maintains that the process of signification is closed, and that the 
signified is itself a complete meaning. He develops this model on the premise that the 
phoneme is the force which initially allows signification to occur, because voice and 
thought are traditionally thought as co-present; this model of thought only recognises 
conscious intention and ignores the role of the unconscious. Derrida's formulation of 
spacing ruptures the closure of binary opposition, and the closure of the signified in the 
self-evidence of the voice is challeged through an appeal to the function, in 
communication, of the remainder, the letter. Derrida notes that writing is made secondary 
because its material fonn does not allow the context in which it signifies to be controlled, 
yet for language to function it must be capable of re-iteration outside the context of the 
thought of the individual using the language. For writing to be what it is, it "must be able 
to function in the radical absence of every empirically determined addressee in general" 
(Derrida 1982a, 315). The privileging of the voice is the privileging of a particular 
context of signification, and thereby establishes the autonomy of the signified, which is 
stabilised by the context of its signification. 
The written text has no closed context, other than that of "the already written," and 
Derrida extends the concept of Writing to include all systems of signification which 
present the effect of differance. Although the signified is subject to context, context is 
infinitely indeterminate; so the authoritative interpretation of textual signifieds is 
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undermined. All forms of categorisation effect closure, such as: author, date, title, and in 
the case of marketable items, the work's status as authentic original or reproduction. The 
simple definition of a field of enquiry, by genre or the "literary" for example, determines 
the interpretative process and the acceptable conclusions. Cultural beliefs regarding 
signification privilege certain types of production and origin, in an attempt to justify the 
meaning that the text is claimed to represent; the following section examines the nature of 
the restrictions that are produced. 
1.5.1. Form and Force 
The explication of the text by literary critics often seeks to differentiate a locus of meaning 
from the remainder of the work. Derrida's argument against the common distinction 
between form and meaning cites the derivation of each from the other, and this provides 
the basis for his examination of closure in the structuralist concept of the book. He 
concludes that the book is not the representation of a meaning anterior to its being 
written, because "meaning must await being written in order to inhabit itself, and in order 
to become, by differing from itself, what it is: meaning" (Derrida 1978, 11). Derrida 
states that pure structure does not exist, except as the fundamental totality which opens 
and overflows itself, "such that it takes on meaning by anticipating a telos which here 
must be understood in its most indeterminate form" (1978, 26). The totality takes on 
meaning by effacing itself, as differance is effaced by the trace of the signified, and the 
effacement results in the spatialisation of meaning, which "risks enclosing progression 
toward the future - becoming - by giving it form" (Derrida 1978, 26). The entry of 
meaning into the text is irreversible, in that it cannot be extracted in summary form as 
some "absolute simultaneity or instantaneousness. This is why there is no space of the 
work, if by space we mean presence or synopsis" (Derrida 1978, 14). Therefore, there 
is no possibility that desire outside the work can be presented as the summary force 
motivating an enclosed progression of the work. The text, however, appears to take on 
the requirement of such an explanation, since the totality of the system of writing is 
effaced, and replaced by the total form of the work. That is, "force is the other of 
language without which language would not be what it is" (Derrida 1978, 27). In the 
16 
cinema, the total fonn of the work is displaced by the instantaneousness of the projection, 
and the progression toward meaning is elided by the apparent forward progression of 
time in the continuum of the projection. The space of the motion picture is erased as the 
"pure" presence of meaning, which presents "presence" in meaning, derived from the 
privileging of speech, as the ultimate reference point. 
1.5.2. The Authorial Presence 
The closure of signified meaning, provided by the claimed proximity of voice to thought, 
extends to the realms outside the spoken signifier, in the fonn of socially ascribed 
authority; for example, the patriarchal authority over the family, and the stability of 
meaning in the literary text and art work conveyed by the legitimating authorial presence. 
The cultural elevation of feminine reproduction requires the artistic production of the male 
author to fonnulate a relationship with the act of production from the feminine position. 
The solution in Western culture is the exclusion of women from the scene of artistic 
production, and the elevation of their role into the idealistic figure of the muse. 
Active participation in patriarchal culture is possible only for those legitimated by the 
terms of the closed symbolic activity, which excludes the natural but privileges the 
purified, cultural Nature. The feminine connotation of creativity, arising from the 
mother's reproductive capacity, threatens the autonomy of the perpetuation of patriarchal 
rule so it is repressed, and creativity is appropriated by the male artist; the maternal role in 
creation is displaced and transcendentalised in the form of the muse, thereby confinning 
the artist's masculine identity and fragmenting the identity of "the woman." Women are 
exteriorised from the privilege given to Nature and their relation to it is categorised as 
passive, implying that they merely bear the child of the father; the feminine identity within 
patriarchal representation of "the woman" is fragmented as aspects are appropriated for 
male culture, and different features of femininity are valued differently: the representation 
of the female body as signifier of sexuality is rendered incompatible with the female body 
as site of childbirth. The nature/culture division places the maternal link with the child in 
a position superior to the paternal, and the father has no certainty that his presence has 
been transfered into the identity of the child. Consequently, the maternal role is devalued 
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and the transcendental legitimation of the Law is introduced into the family situation, 
where only the father's name is handed down and the mother's presence is erased from 
the child's cultural identity. 
The prescription of the muse's feminine identity excludes women writers from the 
pursuit of artistic truth since they cannot participate in an economy of the sign which 
situates the truth's alterity in femininity; the woman writer cannot hold the feminine 
outside herself as something other, without erasing her own identity. The historical 
exclusion of the woman writer from literary production is detailed by Gilbert and Gubar 
in The Madwoman in the Attic, where they also examine the ideological belief that 
creativity is essentially masculine. They find the paternal creator has a theological 
parallel, where the author "fathers" the text and "in the image of the Divine Creator he 
becomes the Author - the sole origin and meaning of his work" (Moi 1985,57). Gilbert 
and Gubar's observations on Nineteenth Century literary ideology are significant, but 
Moi finds that they unify the ideological position and response from women writers of 
the time to an unacceptable extent, where they essentialise the woman writer until they 
have established the feminine authorship in parallel with the model of masculine presence 
which they criticise. Their observations on the transcendentalism associated with the 
author would have been more effectively associated, Moi argues, with the analysis of 
writing found in Barthes's "The Death of the Author." When they find the author 
encoded and essentially present as the Madwoman or other socially exteriorised character 
in the texts under analysis, Gilbert and Gubar close off the potential signifieds, and leave 
only that determined by authorship; detailing their mistake, Moi writes that it is not 
merely the patriarchal ideology which should be rejected, "it is equally necessary to reject 
the critical practice it leads to, a critical practice that relies on the author as the 
transcendental signified of his or her text" (1985, 62). 
The authenticity given to the text or art work through its having an author establishes 
the text's signified by erasing the identity of the text and attribituting the meaning to the 
presence of the author. The anti-theological text, as Barthes would term it, challenges the 
certainty of representation by eliminating the closure produced by the presence of the 
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author. The text for Barthes is writing rather than literature (1977, 147), and should be 
acknowledged in tenns of the veiled nature of the sign; Barthes explains the meaning of 
the text as a dynamic, in tenns similar to Derrida's description of the first (erased) 
writing: "writing ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a 
systematic exemption of meaning" (Barthes, ibid.). However, Barthes's definition of 
writing is more limited than Derrida's, as my section on S/Z concludes, since he situates 
the "evaporation of meaning" with the reader while maintaining that the text is inherently 
meaningful, whereas Derrida poses a more radical barrier to meaning by stating that the 
context of writing as an act of communication must also be challenged. Barthes's 
description of the systematic exemption of meaning is the point at which he diverges from 
Derrida, who extends the context of meaning beyond the system of the text, which is 
Barthes's contextualisation of meaning. 
The extent of the author's implicit control over the interpretation of the work is 
discussed in "What is an Author?" by Foucault, who notes that the restriction of the 
author is effected in the conceptualisation of "the work" as a systematic unit (1977, 118). 
Foucault shows that the author governs the context of representation beyond the 
subjective presence ascribed to the artistic and literary text's author-creator, because the 
proper name of the author is used to represent authority over subject matter, and in some 
cases to establish a discourse which had no previous closure; that is, the author may 
produce "the possibility and the rules of the formation of other texts" (1977, 131). The 
representation of the discursive rules in the text occurs through the repetition of analogies 
and differences, Foucault claims; and the closure that these provide, in the definition of 
the discourse, also provides the textual structure which Derrida cites as revelation of the 
rules's dependence on the representation which conveys them, and the impossibility that 
the discursive work may convey meaning which transcends mediation. That is, the text 
as origin of the discourse is effectively the remainder of the discourse, and is not the 
primary source of meaning: Foucault's comment, that the return to the origin is "an 
effective and necessary means of transforming discursive practice" (1977, 135), implies 
that the text is not part of its own discursive context, so the specification of the site of 
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origin is secondary to the origination of the discourse which forms the identity of the text. 
1.6. Appropriation and the Artistic Signified 
Authorial identity is challenged in the practice of some contemporary visual artists, who 
appropriate the legitimated, original works of others to challenge the certainty of the 
original and the control of the author/artist over the use and interpretation of the work. 
The critical impact of these works is on the traditional closure of the author, the canon, 
and the implication of masculine subjectivity pursuing a feminine object, artistic truth. 
The definition of photography as art is challenged, along with the broad cultural closure 
of the context in which the "artistic" work may be presented. The resources from which 
an artwork may be produced, and the elements of the work which allow the artistic 
presence to be traced are revealed as aspects of closure, which erase the signifier and 
replace it with the authorial presence. The resistance to the traditional forms of closure is 
a direct challenge to the ownership of the signified through appropriation, either of style 
or the traditional work .as a whole. The evidence of mediation between the author and the 
work is shown to have an important influence on critical acceptance of the validity of the 
work as art; not because considerations of style are involved, but because it effects 
authorial closure. 
In order to maintain a critical stance, the appropriation must be effected as a 
comment on the institutional framework within which it takes place. Godeau (1987) 
maintains the centrality of this hypothesis in her analysis of appropriation in photographic 
work, and she uses it to distinguish critical appropriation, which challenges authorial or 
artistic norms, from that which applies appropriation as a stylistic technique in an 
institutionalised fashion. One of those she examines is Sherrie Levine, whose work has 
relevance to questions about the status of the author and the original because she 
rephotographs existing reproductions of works by "canonised masters of photographic 
modernism;" she selects the works for the ideological density in their treatment of topics 
such as the classical nude, the beauty of nature, and the Depression poor (Godeau 1987, 
6). Levine does not retitle, reframe or mediate in any way other than rephotographing the 
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appropriated work, a practice which leads her work to be regarded as fraudulent, both by 
those who own the originals, and those who see her work as a challenge to the integrity 
of the original photograph, because her work is not original as a piece of art and threatens 
the cultural value of art photography and authorial canonicity. The practice of 
photographic appropriation is relatively common, and has given rise to cyclical 
appropriation maintaining the status quo, such as when the advertising tableau, having 
been appropriated by art photography, is reappropriated by advertising as a legitimated 
form, which arises from the initial appropriative activity being uncritical of its institutional 
framework; as Godeau points out, "critical practices not specifically calibrated to resist 
recuperation as aesthetic commodities almost inevitably succumb to this process" (1987, 
16). Levine's non-interventionist appropriation resists reappropriation because all such 
practice challenges the original creating identity. An example of work which appropriates 
tableaux and resists their reappropriation is that of Cindy Sherman, whose photography 
is critical both of the presence of the artist in the work, and the images of women in 
Hollywood B-grade films. She recreates black and white film stills, and dressing as a 
typical character she explicitly presents her artistic presence in the form of the fictional 
presence: the conventional category of the character reveals the artistic presence "to be 
both fictional and absent" (Godeau 1987, 16). Criticism that Sherman maintains the 
objectified feminine image may be dispelled by noting that the dispersal of the authorial 
presence undermines the validity of the image's signified, and indicates the process of the 
entry of the signified into the structure of the representation, rather than presenting the 
signified as a truth, realised through artistic subjectivity. 
1.7. The Nature of Representation: Conclusions 
Representation is traditionally modelled on the production of meaning in a privileged 
context, that is, the theoretical proximity of the signified of the utterance to the thought of 
the speaking subject. The spoken signifier is privileged as a non-mediating medium, and 
the conceptualisation of all other forms of representation and meaning derive from the 
presence of origin in speech. The supplementary nature of representation requires a 
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closed context for its signified to be guaranteed in the absence of the origin, an origin 
produced by the erasure of language in the enunciation in favour of the self-presence of 
the subject. The binary opposition provides a general basis from which the 
speech/writing division extends into different cultural areas, and the authorial closure 
over the text incorporates a male/female division, derived from the patriarchal nature of 
Western culture. Saussure's model of the differential signified is extended by Derrida 
into the demonstration that all signification is differential, from which he posits a general 
Writing, to explain the signified's origin in the trace of dijferance, rather than the subject. 
The effacement of dijferance allows the signified to appear as an independent entity, and 
the closure of origin is also manifested in the closure of form, where meaning and the 
manner of its signification are critically constructed as related but independent 
phenomena. 
The privileged erasure of mediation in the utterance allows other forms of 
representation which present minimal evidence of mediation to be inscribed with the 
metaphysics of originary presence in the production of the signified. The following 
sections pursue the relationship of temporality to the production of the signified, with the 
conclusion that the "present" of the inscription is produced by the inscription, rather than 
represented through it. Photography and cinema are the forms of representation which 
are most affected by theory concerning the production of the signified, since their 
analogical recording aligns them with the non-mediation of the voice. 
The privileging of masculine representational activity situates women in an exterior 
realm, and the representation of "the feminine" is subject to the erasure and veiling effect 
which Derrida notes is the condition for truth. The Lacanian representation of desire is 
examined from this perspective, in the following section. The examples of work by 
Shennan and Levine resist the traditional erasure of mediation in the representation of the 
feminine "essence." The subjectively realised truth of the feminine is problematic, since 
the origin of their work is displaced through appropriation or the object is also the artistic 
subject. The signification is therefore placed in a general context of representation, and 
detached from privileged closures of meaning. 
2 
Representation in Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis 
2.1. Introduction 
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Lacan observes that the subject's reality is mediated by the realm of language, clearly 
separating the sign from the "originary" referent. However, the object of desire in 
Lacan's textual discourse is presented as naturally and transparently "the woman," 
placing the subject's relation to the object of desire, the phallus, in correspondence with 
the possession of the penis. Lacan's text may therefore be investigated for the ellipsis of 
the mediation of language. The model of the linguistic sign which Lacan advances is 
innovative; however, it is also phonocentric, which results in the erasure of the general 
scene of Writing proposed by Derrida, and the introduction of the notion of full presence 
in the word. 
The theoretical apparatus Lacan brings to bear on his description of the dialectic of 
desire opens up a representational structure in language different from that posited by 
classical semiotics. The feature common to classical representation and desire is the 
absent entity. For Lacan however, the sign's function in desire is independent of the 
missing referent. The absent object is important in Lacan, where it causes the subject's 
irreversible entry into language, and structures all signification in a topology of lack. 
This "topology of castration" (Derrida 1982a, 6) is identical to the system based on 
presence (in Western metaphysics), since it governs discourse as a transcendental 
identity, structuring each signifier. The following discussion of Lacan examines the 
representation of desire in language, and develops the concepts, considered in following 
sections, as they are applied in contemporary textual analysis, such as Barthes's 
description of myth. 
2.1.1. Desire in the Lacanian Suhject 
Wilden notes that Lacanian desire is a psychoanalytical recasting of the Hegelian notion 
that human desire is directed at recognition, and requires mediation by language in its 
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transmission between subjects, so the object of desire becomes that which mediates any 
relationship with another (Lacan 1968, 163). Lacan further states that the subject's desire 
is directed at a locus, the Other, from which the medhlm of language immediately returns 
the subject's own message in an inverted form. The signifier represents desire, but is not 
the object of desire itself, since the sign is incorporated in a differential system. The 
deferral of signification through the signifying chain may be temporarily interrupted by 
the structural closure of the sentence, which is not a permanent closure, and may occur in 
a textual reproduction, suggesting that the Lacanian model of desire may be used to 
explain the structure of narrative representation. 
2.2. The Subject of the Enunciation 
The conscious is traditionally perceived as a central, self-present entity, because the 
utterance appears to provide self-referential signification through the personal pronoun, 
"1" Lacan's analysis, which derives from Freud, states that the singular "I" of the 
utterance does not represent the interior nature of the decentred subject. The Lacanian 
subject is discontinuous, has no central essence and presents a continuous identity only 
through the projection of the "I," which is merely a locus in the sentence conveying it. 
The shifter, "I," refers to its object through convention, but because it designates the 
person who utters it, "it can only refer existentially to the utterance" (Barthes 1967,22). 
The speech act may be divided between the utterance (the actual words spoken) and the 
enunciation (the act of speaking); from these terms, the apprehension of the self in the 
cogito makes the assumption that there is no distinction between the subject of the 
utterance and the subject of the enunciation. Freud challenges the full presence of the 
conscious identity, which the cogito seeks to confirm, by showing, in the analysis of 
dreams, jokes and speech errors, that it is not privileged over the Unconscious. Lacan 
argues against privileging the conscious in speech (as in the cogito) because the subject of 
the utterance is displaced from the conscious subject which brings the enunciation into 
being. For Lacan, the "I" of the utterance designates the subject of the enunciation "but 
does not signify it" (1977, 298), and the transient subject of the Symbolic passes through 
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the signifier but is not present in it. The signifier designates the locus of the Other, which 
occupies the site held by the subject prior to its retroactive constitution. The code of the 
utterance is determined only with the completion of its final term, and the signification is 
structured by the points de capiton which are points where the signifier is anchored to the 
signified. However, Lacan maintains the primacy of the spoken word in his theory of the 
subject's constitution by language, which confines his refutation of self-presence within 
the boundaries of phonocentrism. 
2.2.1. The Entry into Language 
The infant Lacanian subject constitutes an amorphous plenitude, and makes no distinction 
between "self" and the surrounding environment. In the satisfaction of its demand for 
food, the infant may recognise the breast as the partial object which it perceives as part of 
its own plenitude; then in weaning, the child may realise a lack in its own plenitude, and 
striving to regain this loss, the child will enter the Symbolic and express its desire for the 
restoration of unity through the signifying chain. Augmenting the importance of Freud's 
discovery that in his grandson's Fort! Da! game the child is attempting to control the 
presence and absence of an object, Lacan shows that the child's identification of the 
object external to itself is the identification of itself in an objectified form. The subject's 
representation of the objet a is the return of its own identity, and similarly, the locus of 
the Other is an objectification of the subject's identity which returns, in an inverted form, 
the message of desire sent by the subject. Lacan states that the Other is therefore the 
locus from which the question of the subject's existence may be put (1968, 108), and the 
form of the question is best understood, according to the graph of the subversion of the 
subject, as Che vuoi? "What do you want of me?" which is the inverted form of the 
subject's own message "What does he(sic) want of me?" (1977, 335). The subject's 
desire for the Other returns as the Other's desire for the subject, so the desire for 
recognition is misrecognised as the Other's desire for recognition: the subject's alienation 
in the Other transforms its recognition into meconnaissance and does not allow its own 
desire to be answered directly. 
The Symbolic is the realm confining the subject once it leaves the pre-linguistic and 
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pre-Oedipal Imaginary, which is never abandoned fully, and remains in association with 
the Symbolic. The Symbolic structures the Imaginary and the Real, so the Real is what is 
real for the subject as experienced through the Symbolic. The subject initially encounters 
the phallus in the Imaginary when it realises the lack that arises through the withdrawal of 
the mother's immediate satisfaction of need and demand. The Symbolic contains the 
social law which structures the subject's family relationship, although not necessarily 
through the involvement of family members. The law is first expressed in the Oedipal 
relationship, where the interaction mother-child-phallus is changed through the presence 
of the Symbolic father, which "inserts the lack of object into a new dialectic" (Lacan 
1968, 186). The social concepts learned by the subject are represented in the Symbolic, 
where they structure the dialectical expression of desire in the signifier. 
2.2.2. The Gaze 
The return of desire in the utterance may be illustrated by the return of the gaze, which the 
subject imagines in the field of the Other (Lac an 1979,84). When consciously directing 
its gaze at an object, the subject is aware of sending the gaze until the object is 
recognised, at which point the gaze disappears and the object presents itself to vision 
(Lacan 1979, 89). The object itself has no meaning, and the recognition of the object 
requires the subject's misrecognition of its own identity, which has been split in order to 
accommodate the world (Lac an 1979, 1(6). This split allows the subject to perceive 
itself in its perceptions, so that all perceptual representations belong to the subject and are 
part of its formation (Lac an 1979,81). The subject's environment appears as spectacle, 
which is there to be seen and which is all-seeing, so the subject's representations gain an 
independence which allows them to control the central field of vision, in which desire 
displaces reality as marginal. The disappearance of the gaze is the moment of idealisation 
when the subject identifies itself in the object; and in the utterance, at the moment when 
the desire is identified, the subject has been subverted and the statement is no longer 
external to it. 
26 
2.3. Representation and the Symbolic 
Lacan uses the classical definition of representation, and notes that the metaphysical 
issues of representation are of no relevance to the subject (1979, 106), but the issues of 
representation are of relevance in the Lacanian text itself. However, the type of 
representation which occurs in the Symbolic does not adhere to the classical 
representative structure, and may provide a basis from which to criticise the classical 
model and to advocate the functioning of a different form. The dialectic of desire is 
possible only if the representation of desire in the signifying chain is independent and 
actively signifying with a force derived from its own structure; if the signifiers merely 
formed a passive representation of desire active elsewhere, the subject could undergo no 
relocation. In Lacan's theoretical formulation, the representation of desire in the 
signifying chain reveals the absence of a simple origin, because the sending out of the 
representation is also a sending back that involves discontinuity in the transmission and 
reception of the message. The signifier represents desire that is discontinuous with the 
subject since it returns as the discourse of the Other; and the Symbolic may also project 
the desire sent by another subject (the castrated Other, whose discourse reveals that its 
site is also one of lack) or the idealised Other of the Imaginary representation. 
"The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis" stresses the reality of the word, and 
a footnote referring to Freud's observations on repetition in the re-experiencing of a 
trauma reads: the subject is "reproducing it tangibly, as though it were actually 
happening, instead of remembering it" (Lacan 1968, 17n.43). Elsewhere, Lacan states 
that "repetition is not reproduction" (1979, 50), meaning that the act is symbolic and 
should not be analysed in terms of the existence of objects in the Real, and this may be 
interpreted as a challenge to the notion of origin, and the original encounter with the Real. 
Derrida's examination of the Freudian concept of the memory trace, which is inscribed 
after the breaching of the initial resistance to the stimulus offered by the psychical neuron 
(where a temporal onset and termination is implicit), leads him to "maintain that in the 
first time of the contact between two forces, repetition has begun" (1978, 202). 
Subsequent repetitions are the rebreachings of the pathways of the memory imprint, and 
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this process cannot distinguish between an original and repeated breaching, which elides 
the difference between origin and repetition; this therefore eliminates the concept of the 
origin and designates all memory traces as (original) repetitions. 
In the phenomenon of repetition, Lacan finds the "birth of Truth in the word," and 
then immediately evokes "the reality of what is neither true nor false" (1979, 17). All 
utterances are received by the subject at the same level of expression because there is no 
possibility of metalanguage, since "any statement of authority has no other guarantee than 
its very enunciation, and it is pointless for it to seek it in another signifier, which could 
not appear outside this locus in any way" (Lac an 1977, 310). The locus of the 
enunciation is the spoken word, and Lacan bases the context of the code in the 
metonymic signifying chain, on the basis that it signifies truth, when the notion of truth is 
itself derived from the signification. The veiling of truth in the word privileges the 
spoken utterance, because Lacan finds the utterance committed to the communication of 
truth, "even if it is intended to deceive" (1977,43). Derrida replies to this statement by 
noting that "what is neither tnle nor false is reality. But as soon as speech is inaugurated, 
one is in the register of the unveiling of truth" (1987a, 469-70), and the written text is 
therefore treated as a derivative of the spoken enunciation. The "pure" manifestation of 
desire requires the utterance to be assessed as a transparent medium, and the realm of 
speech maintains its function at the expense of other forms of Symbolic representation. 
Lacan's seminar on the effect of the "letter" in Poe's "The Purloined Letter" attempts to 
demonstrate the literary context of the truth in speech, which Derrida, in "Le Facteur de la 
Verite" (1987a), takes as an implicit acknowledgement that the voice is merely privileged 
in the context of Lacan's theory, since the textual frame in which it is inscribed is not 
accounted for in the movement of the signifier and the unveiling of its truth. Lacan 
refrains from theorising a general Symbolic system of representation, which would not 
subordinate the graphic inscription to the order of desire expressed in the utterance, and 
he maintains the classical orientation toward the referent, for although he grants 
supremacy to the signifier, his theoretical work does not acknowledge the context 
through which the phonetic signifier is represented by the "supplement" of writing. 
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2.3.1. The Points de Capiton and Meaning 
Lacan states that the signification of the utterance is closed by the points de capitan, for 
the glissement of the signifier would otherwise render speech meaningless. After the last 
term of the utterance, the points de capitan retroactively structure the utterance, and 
Wilden notes that their command over meaning represents their "'reference back' to a 
symbolic function" (Lacan 1968,273). The closure effected by the points may therefore 
be traced to an originary force, which results in the meaning of the utterance being 
ascribed to the closure of a totalising structure. That is, the notion that the points 
structure meaning by representing a primary signifier suggests that Lacan's Symbolic is 
subjected to a transcendental ising closure. The structure of referral which Lacan states as 
the stabilising force of meaning is in Derrida's opinion an idealisation of the "structural 
effect of signification in general" (Derrida 1987a, 464). The points in the signifying 
chain, which interrupt the glissement, represent signification itself, rather than effecting 
representation through the anchoring to the "central" lack of the phallus, Derrida believes. 
The message arises from the diachronic structuration of the sentence by the points, 
however, the synchronic structure is "more hidden" (hence, the complicity of 
phonocentrism and veil), and "it is this structure which takes us to the source" (Lac an, 
1977,303). The phallus is implied as the source, as Lacan makes clear by noting that in 
describing the utterance, "one can speak of code only if it is already the code of the 
Other" (1977, 305). So, the metonymic deferral of desire along the signifying chain 
signifies the desire of the Other, yet Lacan insists on placing the signifier of lack outside 
the sentence, where it acts as the source of meaning. The context of the utterance is 
closed not by the diachronic effect of the points de capitan, in which case, but by the 
originary context of the phallus, as signifier of lack. The glissement of the signifier, 
which Lacan shows is necessary for signification, is lost in the sentence and replaced 
with the signification of lack by privileged signifiers, Lacan claims. Derrida states that 
the signification is itself the proof that there is no originary presence (or absence) deferred 
through the sign, and that Lacan is displacing the lack in the Symbolic into the centrist 
topology of castration, in order to posit an underlying, truthful communication. 
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The function of the points de capitan, in differentiating the message from the 
communication, is demonstrated in Lacan's appeal to the validity of the statement, "I am 
lying." The enunciation manifested in the statement is an "I am deceiving you," given by 
Lacan as the deception which allows the analyst in return to formulate, "You are telling 
the truth," as a response which does not mediate and replies with the subject's own 
enunciation (1979, 139-40). The "am lying" is a signifier, the first of the points de 
capitan, which retroactively determines the second as the signification of the "I" (Lacan 
1979, 139). The true signification, Lacan believes, is determined in the closure of the 
"am lying" as a spoken signifier, and the question of signification in the written text may 
be resolved only if the text is secondary to the utterance. The statement contains a 
message which is other than the communication of the utterance, and which Lacan 
displaces into speech as the veiling which constitutes it as truth. The truth which the 
subject speaks in the example is displaced out of the locus of the signifier and situated in 
the communication with a listening Other. Derrida shows that the signification in the 
medium oflanguage requires the "absence" of the sender and receiver from the scene of 
representation, and implies that the term communication is problematic. So, the "truth" in 
the utterance is an effect of the spatial form of meaning being theorised as something 
exterior to meaning, and that form provides the motif of the veil. 
The necessity of the points, which Derrida places in a non-originary position, results 
from Lacan's privileging of the spoken utterance. Derrida's observations concerning the 
"pure" temporal flow of speech may be critically applied to the description of the points. 
Lacan holds that the points are heterogeneous: one is "a locus (a place, rather than a 
space)," while the other is "a moment (a rhythm, rather than a duration)" (1977, 304). 
The moment of the second point, which is the punctuation of complete signification, is 
itself produced as point by the signification. The "pure" presence of the point is merely 
the result of spacing, and is an effect of closure in signification, as the "presence" of the 
signified, rather than the precursor to meaning. The diachronic closure of the punctuation 
is complicit with the Lacanian notion of truth in the spoken word, from which the 
mediation of the Symbolic is elided by the testament of speech as communication, and 
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desire for the Other. Without the stated temporal linearity of the utterance, the points 
would not appear to originate in the signification, and their existence is Lacan's 
constitution of the phallus as that which is veiled, by specifying the structure of the 
sentence as the message which veils the truth of the communication. The mediation of 
the Symbolic in the dialectic of desire is elided, because the formula for human language 
(the returning of the sender's message in inverted form) places the phallus as the central 
point in the subject's communication. 
2.3.2. The Representation of the Phallus 
Lacan states that the phallus is the signifier of signifiers, and that it governs the signifying 
chain, in which there is instability in the relationship of signifier to signified. The 
Saussurian sign is a stable unit, in which the signifier and signified, unified by the bond 
between them, relate to each other as the two sides of a leaf of paper. Lacan radically 
revises the nature of the sign, and destroys its unity by granting the signifier sovereign 
position over the signified, since the signified may function as signifier of another 
signified. Lacan breaks the bond, symbolised by the bar (/) in Saussure's diagram (Sis), 
and revalues the bar as that which resists signification. The lack of stability in the sign 
allows the slippage (glissement ) of the signifier over the signified, causing signification 
to be guaranteed only in the context of the utterance. Lacan emphasises the bar to 
signification and the lack of cohesion between the ranks of signifier and signified in his 
description of the Symbolic, yet he maintains the stability of the signifier of signifiers, the 
phallus. The phallus functions both in the Imaginary, as an object, and in the Symbolic, 
where it is represented as that which "cannot enter the domain of the signifier without 
being barred from it, that is to say, covered over by castration" (1968, 187). The 
transcendental signification of the phallus as signifier of signifiers is a contradiction of the 
terms which Lacan insists are necessary for signification, such as the irreducible 
movement of metonymy along the chain of signifiers. Wilden finds no adequate 
structural explanation of the phallus's transcendence in the Symbolic after it arises as an 
Imaginary object, and he suggests the "difficulty derives from the way that Imaginary 
elements may enter the Symbolic ... [and] ... from the way that symbolic elements may 
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be reduced to Imaginary functions" (Lacan 1968, 186). 
Derrida criticises Lacan for his representation of the phallus in the voice, since he 
perceives this as phonocentrism. In Lacan's protest against the possibility of 
metalanguage, Derrida finds the phallus ideally conceived as that which is fully present in 
itself, and indivisible in any way. For Derrida, the signified appears when differance is 
erased by the formation of the trace of its erasure, and this allows signification to occur 
but does not signify differance itself. However for Lacan, the disappearance of the 
phallus in the veiling signifier is the process by which the phallus is signified, and which 
interrupts the arbitrary and differential structure of the signifying chain. Lacan states that 
the raising (Aufhebung ) of any signifiable to the function of signifier is signified by the 
phallus (1977, 288). This, in Derrida's understanding, is a reversal of the Hegelian 
Aufhebung, which "lifts the sensory signifier into the ideal signified" (1987a, 480). 
Lacan supposes that the voice, in the utterance, is privileged by the phallus, however, the 
position of the spoken word in the logos "annuls the reversal" (Derrida 1987a, 480), 
because raising the phallus into the site which gains its privilege from the logos merely 
incorporates the phallus into the existing metaphysics. 
2.3.3. The Transparency of the Veil 
Lacan's use of the voice as locus of truth, and signification of the phallus, is an example 
of "structural complicity between the motifs of the veil and the voice, between the truth 
and phonocentrism, phallocentrism and logocentrism" (Derrida 1987a, 479). The voice 
provides the barred signifier which represents the exclusion of the phallus from the 
Symbolic, and the veiling of the phallus by the spoken signifier is similar to the castration 
of the biological symbol, where the phallus is not the "organ, penis or clitoris, that it 
symbolises" (Lacan 1977, 285), yet the delineation of desire between having and not 
having the phallus results in the penis taking on the ptivilege of being signifier; hence, the 
complicity between phallocenttism and phonocentrism. With respect to the phallus, the 
relations between the sexes "turn around a 'to be' and a 'to have'" (Lac an 1977, 289), 
and Lacan refines this relationship by specifying that the "to have" is modified by the 
intervention of a "to seem." This intervention allows the penis to act as the privileged 
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signifier, and Lacan consequently states that "the woman" "finds the signifier of her own 
desire in the body of him to whom she addresses her demand for love" (1977, 290). The 
governing of desire by the penis is evident in what Derrida terms a "determined situation 
... in which the phallus is the mother's desire to the extent that she does not have it" 
(1987a,480). The symbolic relationship between the phallus and the penis is not explicit 
in the male body because the penis is part of the Real's plenitude in its own right, 
however, in comparison with the female body, the biological relationship is revealed. 
The female body is a plenitude in the Real and cannot lack anything, so the Symbolic 
castration which is ascribed to "the woman" can only arise by situating the phallus in the 
body of the male by virtue of the penis. The subject only has access to the phallus as 
signifier in the locus of the Other, so a splitting in the subject results, because the subject 
must be the phallus for the Other, which is also the loclls of the phallus for the subject, 
and what the subject has "is worth no more than what he does not have" (my italics, 
Lacan 1977, 289). The exchange of desire in the Symbolic is determined by Lacan on 
the basis of the biological division of the sexes, and the phallus is the privileged signifier 
in male dominated society because it is associated with the penis. 
The biologism which orients the description of sexual desire, and posits the Other as 
"the woman," connotes femininity in the veiling castration. In the phallogocentric 
evaluation, the lack of a penis disposes the female body to be characterised as the natural 
Other; and the code of femininity may also be naturalised at the cultural, Symbolic level 
through cosmetics and fashion. The cosmetic mask may act as a screen both in the 
Imaginary, where it is a lure for the gaze and gives the impression of something hidden 
behind the appearance, and in the Symbolic, where it may have the same veiling effect 
but is the signifier of the desire to connote the phallus beyond; in the Symbolic, Lacan 
notes, the subject "knows how to play with the mask as that beyond which there is a 
gaze" (1979, 107). Lacan demonstrates the llse of the veil in the dual context, which 
allows it to signify the essence of femininity, in relating: "Such is the woman concealed 
behind her veil: it is the absence of the penis that turns her into the phallus, the object of 
desire. Draw attention to this absence in a more precise way by getting her to wear a 
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pretty wig and fancy dress, and you, or rather she, will have plenty to tell us about" 
(1977, 322). 
The essence of femininity is therefore in the masquerade, which Lacan believes the 
feminine identity pretends to pretend is a veiling of the phallus in order to signify a desire 
to be the phallus. The essentially feminine aspect Lacan attributes to the veil's function, 
that it makes "virile display in the human being seem feminine" (1977, 291), also 
displays the binarism in his description of gender. For Lacan the feminine poses a 
contradiction: the displacement it undergoes in the masquerade makes it enigmatic, yet it 
may be essentialised and represented, since the mask is a transparent signifier, connoting 
itself as referent, resulting in there being nothing beyond the appearance. 
2.4. Decentring the Signifier of Femininity 
Visual representations of the female body in fashion photography clearly utilise the 
economy of femininity connoted through the veil and cosmetic. The photographer Sylvia 
Kolbowski assembles representations of femininity in cropped and serialised form in 
order to contrive a "critical reading of the fashion image calculated to mpture the fictions 
of such representation" (Godeau 1984, 100). The grouping entitled Model Pleasure II 
(1982) consists of images of models veiled by fashion garments and obstacles such as 
venetian blinds, while in Model Pleasure part 5 (1983) the focus is on the veil of 
cosmetics, and the cropped close-ups reveal the similarity of essential facial features and 
their make-up design; the averted gaze is also readily apparent, and parallels the 
assumption of the natural spectacle of the female body in Lacan's example, found "in the 
satisfaction of a woman who knows that she is being looked at, on condition that one 
does not show her that one knows that she knows" (1979, 75). The images challenge the 
connotation in Lacan that there is nothing beyond the veil, by presenting reversals of the 
gaze, showing the "inside" of the appearance. As a result, the screen is emptied of 
significance and the signified desire for the phallus is shown to arise from the context of 
the masculine gaze on the feminine object. The application of cosmetics is not 
contextualised by the masculine gaze in Desperately Seeking Susan (detailed in a 
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following section); so, desire cannot be ascribed to the central position of the phallus in 
the Symbolic. Model Pleasure part 5 (1983) includes a photograph of a printing press, 
possibly to indicate the level of reality to which the images belong. The use of the 
appropriated image contributes to a shift in the evaluation of the artistic resource from the 
originary "real" to the already representative, potentially showing that the real is 
determined by the referral from representation to the source, which is already designated 
as representative. The Lacanian Real is only detem1ined for the subject as a result of the 
entry into the Symbolic, so there is no origin for representation which is independently 
accessible without the mediation of the signifier. 
2.5. Representation in Lacanian Psychoanalysis: 
Conclusions 
The signifier's mediation between the subject and the Other is structured by the central 
lack of the phallus, although Lacan states that there is no stable relationship between the 
signifier and the signified. Lacan's claim is complicit with the logocentrism of Western 
philosophy, since it privileges the spoken word as the locus of meaning, closed by the 
phallus. The Symbolic realm is shown to mediate in the subject's experience of the Real, 
so the primary nature of all experience is questioned. The phonocentrism Derrida detects 
in Lacan's theory reveals the basis from which the "truth" of the word is developed, and 
the context through which Lacan's representation of the phallus places women in a 
secondary position. The phallus is defined as that which is veiled, so the veil itself is for 
Lacan the signifier of desire for the phallus; the biologism of Lacan's theory ascribes the 
female the position of natural Other, and the cosmetic veil is interpreted by Lacan as the 
veiling of the already missing penis. There is nothing beyond the veil in that context, so 
the veil is itself the representation of the veil; the mediation of the Symbolic is elided as 
the phallus provides the ultimate meaning of the signification of castration. 
The centrist origin of Lacan's claims are challenged in the examples of work by 
Kolbowski which demonstrate that the signifier of the veil is not transparent and that the 
notion of there being nothing beyond the veil is derived from the closure of the context of 
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its signification. The veil's screening of the gaze is shown to have an inherently 
masculine orientation in the claim that it signifies the desire for the phallus/penis, and 
mediation of the gaze by the Other is elided in Lacan's scenario of the woman's desire to 
be spectacle. 
3.1. Introduction 
3 
Desire and Code: 
The Function of Myth 
in Barthes 
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The translation of Lacanian theory into textual analysis involves the evaluation of the role 
of the Symbolic and the unconscious within the text, rather than the psychoanalysis of the 
characters, the author or the reader. The parallel between the subject and the text is found 
in their both being constituted by language. Barthes's model of the text-as-subject 
examines the dynamics of textual signification at the level of the reader's recognition of 
meaning, which creates an overlap in Barthes's explanation of desire in the text, since the 
desire which Barthes traces between the meaningful codes may also be interpreted as the 
desire for meaning itself, where "meaning" functions as the objectification of the 
subject's knowledge in the text. 
The function of the code in representation, Barthes believes, is the referral of 
meaning to the already written, which detaches the representational medium from the 
referent as originary source, yet the code as an independent structure is not subjected to 
the dissemination of origin. Therefore, Barthes posits the structuration of the text at the 
level of the code, eliding the fact that meaning erases itself as structure. The concepts of 
presence and absence explored in terms of castration are based on the acceptance of 
unproblematic nature of the presence of meaning, because Barthes elides the letter from 
the scene of representation, and merely considers code as meaning. Consequently, 
Barthes's textual analysis of realist narrative maintains a bias toward the spoken 
communication, and defmes realism as representation, privileging the code. 
The text presents the interaction of codes which are drawn from the field of public 
discourse, the doxa. The structure of the code represents the anchoring of the utterance 
by the points de capiton. Barthes designates the doxa as the contemporary myth. The 
similarity between myth and the Lacanian unconscious is in the imperceptibility of myth 
37 
in the text. That is, a signified which is not readily accepted by the reader as the inherent 
meaning is not accorded the status of myth. The Lacanian unconscious is defined as that 
"marked by a blank or occupied by a falsehood" (Lacan 1977,50), which is the nature of 
the meaning, apparently inherent, in the text supporting myth. My examination of the 
function of myth in Barthes is directed at the relationship between realism and 
representation, the interaction of meaning and desire in the Symbolic, and the implied 
heterogeneity of code as meaning and structure. The analysis concentrates on analogical 
photographic representation (providing a basis for the analysis of cinema in the following 
chapter) and the realist text; with a focus on the elision of the medium in Barthes's 
theorisation of the structure of meaning. 
3.2. Photographic Representation and Social Codes 
Barthes shows the entry of myth into the field of representation by explaining the 
semiotic concepts of denotation and connotation. The signifier is the denotation, and the 
connotation is the signified concept, which itself is a signifier of connotation, or myth. 
The signified connotation occurs within the text or image as a fragment of ideology 
(Barthes 1967, 91); not the formulated, philosophical ideology of political theory, but the 
unconsciously assimilated field of public opinion, which is diffuse and specific to each 
culture. Barthes states that the origin of the code of connotation is "neither artificial (as in 
a true language) nor natural, but historical" (1977, 22), making it a product ofthe society 
in which it is found and thereby allowing the connotation to be naturalised by the denoted 
message. 
Denotation and connotation are conveyed through codes that are socially constructed; 
however, in the case of photography the former lacks codification, and relies on the 
plenitude of nature/reality to provide the syntagmatic aspect of the image. A drawing or 
sketch is always coded through its selectivity and style, but the photograph is a form of 
analogical reproduction, and this denotative neutrality gives the photograph the nature of 
a "'flat' anthropological fact" (Barthes 1977, 45). Since the denoted content of the 
photograhic image resists codification, the myth is connoted more effectively, for "it is 
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the syntagm of the denoted message which 'naturalises' the system of the connoted 
message" (Barthes 1977, 51). The lack of denotative code allows the connotation to 
disperse through the whole image, so the message seems to arise from the natural 
manifestation of the real. However, the absence of code in the denotative level of the 
photograph, and the absence of disruption to the entry of myth, suggests that Barthes 
may be fragmenting a phenomenon of signification in order for him to reconstitute the 
fragments into a unified textual element which is not fundamental to the signification. 
Barthes states that the signifier of myth is "at the same time meaning and form" (1983, 
102), but in the text when myth becomes form the meaning "evaporates, only the letter 
remains" (1983, 103). The implication which may be drawn from the latter is that there 
is a pure textual structure which supports the entry and evaporation of meaning. 
The photograph, Barthes speculates, must have a "brute" form (1977,44), to which 
the aspects of connotation are applied, and implicitly he suggests that the photographic 
text may be determined as something other than meaning. Connotation is always present 
in the image, for even the act of pointing a camera at an object allows it to become a 
signifier supporting a signified. The mechanical aspects of photography "(framing, 
distance, lighting, focus, speed) all effectively belong to the plane of connotation" 
(Barthes 1977,44); so in photography "there is never art but always meaning" (ibid. 24), 
because the aesthetic aspects of the photograph connote "Art." 
3.2.1. Barthes's Demonstration Reading 
Barthes selects a photograph from the cover of an issue of Paris-Match: "a young Negro 
in a French uniform is saluting, with his eyes uplifted, probably fixed on a fold of the 
tricolor" (1983, 101); and he demonstrates that the features of the image are not 
irrevocably unified, by reading the image on three separate levels. Assuming the 
Paris-Match image expresses French imperiality, Barthes finds that, in the literal reading 
of the signifier, the saluting Negro is an example of French imperiality, and is a symbol 
for it (1983, 115). Read solely for the signified, the myth is found imposed on the 
signifier in the image, and that the signifier, the saluting Negro, is an alibi for French 
imperiality. Since the inscription of the mythical concept in the denotative signifier is a 
39 
marketed idea, a major step in decoding the myth is the identification of the particular 
social group at which the concept is aimed with the expectation of their sympathetic 
response, that is, natural reading rather than decoding. Finally, reading the myth as a 
whole, Barthes finds the interaction of the codes establishes the soldier as the very 
presence of French imperiality. The subject's complete acceptance of connoted material 
in the denotation indicates that the myth has transformed history into Nature, and the 
mythical image is not perceived by Barthes as a differential representational economy. 
The presence of imperiality is the objectification of the reader's imperialist ideological 
beliefs in the photographic text, and not the reading of a special type of signifier. The 
presence is not simple and irreducible, but is rather the presence signified by the erasure 
of the signifier, as in the self-presence determined through the immediacy of the 
utterance. The objectification of the self in the locus of the Other, in Lacan, results in the 
Other being the site of lack and desire. Barthes's objectification results in a textual 
plenitude, which erases the medium of the photograph as the subject's Symbolic message 
is received in an idealised, non-inverted form. The idealised signification of myth is not 
possible as Barthes proposes. However, the process of reading for myth demonstrates 
the absence of inherent meaning in the text. 
3.2.2. The New Space-Time Category 
Barthes's examination of the relationship between the photographic signifier, signified 
and referent leads him to conclude that the photograph "corresponds to a decisive 
mutation of informational economies" (1977,45). The photographic signifier necessarily 
refers to a real thing, because the photograph could not occur without one, yet the 
referent can be designated no further than "having-been-there" (Barthes 1977, 44). 
Barthes claims that the distortion of the informational economy of the photograph is 
found because "the power of authentification exceeds the power of representation" 
(1981a, 89), yet this allows a "pure" non-expressive structure to provide the base of the 
photograph from which connotation arises. The concept of authentification implies an 
element of truth is present in the recording of the originary nature of the referent. So, the 
differentiation of the concepts of denotation and representation leads to their self-erasing 
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reconstitution at the originary point of the referent, which produces a misleading 
definition of authentification as something outside representation. The photograph cannot 
indicate what it is that has been, since the photographic "testimony bears not on the object 
but on time" (Barthes 1981a, 89). Barthes determines that the photographic 
representation provides the evidence of "a new space-time category: spatial immediacy 
and temporal anteriority" (1977,44). The testimony to the past time of the photograph is 
problematic in that the past moment itself is not autonomous and is the effect of 
representation. Derrida demonstrates the effect of the erasure of the signified as presence 
as that which conditions the thinking of time on the basis of the present. The same 
situation occurs in Barthes's temporal testimony, which bears on the presence of 
signification rather than the past present of the recording. As such, the representational 
economy of the photograph does not derive from the temporal authenticity of the referent 
but is engaged in the production of the authenticity. The photograph's authentification is 
re-iterable, as is the authentification of the signature, and the photograph may be likened 
to an analogical signature, but not to a temporal signature, since the temporality is 
secondary to the presence of the signified. As Derrida notes, the signature, in order to 
function, "must be able to detach itself from the present and singular intention of its 
production" (l982a, 328). When the testimony of the photograph is compared with the 
testimony of other photographs, the sameness of the testimony indicates that the past 
moment is not an absolute singUlarity. Each photograph testifies to the "same" authentic 
past, which undermines the "new" space-time category, and aligns it instead with the 
Western metaphysical tradition of the autonomous presence. The photograph's referent 
that has been has no identity in the photograph until it is encountered in the subject's 
presence, in which an Imaginary recognition may occur, projecting an identity into the 
object as the subject's representation of it, and allowing the Symbolic to ascribe the object 
a mythical connotation. 
3.2.3. The Photographic Signified and Desire 
Barthes's reflections on photography, in Camera Lucida, evoke the hallucinatory quality 
of the photograph. Shortly after her death, Barthes pursues his mother's identity as the 
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referent of a photograph, but in spite of his desire for a trace of her, the likeness sustains 
nothing more than the knowledge that she is photographed, and Barthes must provide her 
identity as his own unauthenticated signified, from his present. The formulation of the 
concepts in Camera Lucida often demonstrate the failing of Barthes's desire, as he 
searches in the photograph for a trace of the guaranteed object. For example, Barthes 
expresses his distaste for the colour photograph on the basis that colour appears as an 
artifice added to the "original truth" of the black and white photograph, where his 
requirement is "certainty that the photographed body touches me with its own rays and 
not with superadded light" (198la, 81). Barthes is placing colour on the level of 
connotation, which is acceptable, yet he attempts to erase the connotation that he must 
also recognise in the monotone gradient, and privileges the black and white photograph 
as that closer to the referent. By displacing the evidence for the referent out of the 
image's colour, he risks assigning it to the two-dimensional form of the 
three-dimensional object, although he wishes to displace everything out of the image 
which "is already a kind of mediation" (1981 a, 66). His desire for meaning as a trace of 
his mother unmediated by connotation leads him in search of a photographic 
pre-expressive stratum, which the differentiation between two systems of meaning, 
connotation and denotation, suggests is the fundamental structure of meaning. Finally, 
he admits that, whatever quality he attempts to privilege in relation to the referent, the 
referent is always beyond it. However, he maintains the authenticity of the image as a 
temporal event, and seizes upon the traces of the daylight hours as the object of his desire 
which has meaning beyond the limitations he encounters. The comment concerning his 
mother's photograph is italicised where it relates the time of the event: "the treasure of 
rays which emanated from my mother as a child ... on that day" (198la, 82). 
3.2.4. The Social Image 
Modern society characteristically consumes the photographic image in the manner that 
past societies consumed beliefs (Barthes 1981a, 119), and this tendency is producing a 
world where the illustration of conflicts and desires minimises their social impaet, 
Barthes claims. He suggests society is becoming indifferent, in an environment of 
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consumption, where the general image replaces the referent and homogenises the natures 
of the image and the real. Barthes's comments may border on nostalgia for the referent, 
if they are not placed in the context of his desire to maintain difference between 
representational economies, where no system dominates or establishes itself as the 
privileged discourse of the real, as occurs in the classical tradition. Barthes concludes 
Camera Lucida with the observation that the photograph may be either mad or tame, 
depending on the critical approach to its representation: "tame if its realism remains 
relative, tempered by aesthetic or empirical habits" (1981a, 119) and consumed as an 
object under the strictures of an art philosophy alien to its nature; mad, if it is confronted 
in "the wakening of intractable reality" (ibid.). 
The distinction between the mad and the tame of photography resembles the 
observations Barthes makes upon the different types of reading which may be evoked in 
a text. The function of the code in the differing interpretations is that of weaving together 
the meanings, either as a unity of as a radically plural assemblage of "meanings." The 
criticism directed at Barthes's theory maintains that the "intractable reality" of the text 
does not need Barthes's expository investigation, because the text is not founded upon 
the critical closures which are applied in its interpretation. The following section 
considers the necessity of the "closed" reading, which Barthes seeks to challenge, for the 
development of the "open" reading. 
3.3. Representation and Realism in the Novel 
For Barthes, the reader's encounter with the text has a dual aspect: the readerly text 
(lisible ) is the product consumed by the reader, while the writerly text (scriptible ) is 
produced by the reader who acknowledges, in a reading which is basically a writing, the 
infinite plurality of the text. Barthes claims that the writerly cannot be displayed for 
discussion, but that its negative counterpart can, and is the topic of S/2. The distinction 
between the readerly and the writerly is formulated by Barthes with an implicit closure on 
the representational nature of the text, compounded by his use of the realist genre to 
demonstrate the terminology he proposes. Johnson claims that Barthes produces his own 
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readerly closure on Sarrasine in order to write S/Z, and she demonstrates that Balzac's 
text provides its own undermining of the privileging of "the whole" in opposition to 
castration (1981, 169). Johnson's analysis concentrates on the difference within the 
Balzacian text's discourse on the whole versus castration, and the absence of the closure 
attributed to it by Barthes; however, she does not fully address the representational 
implications of Barthes's readerly text. Barthes states that he will "call any readerly text a 
classic text" (1974, 4), and he defines the writerly text as productive and not 
representative (1974, 5). An examination of the complicity between the readerly text and 
the realist genre (which Barthes tem1S representational), may conclude that the readerly is 
a displaced form of the pure, complete text, which leads Johnson to criticise Barthes's 
closure on the general grounds that "the readerly text is itself nothing other than a 
deconstruction of the readerly text" (1981, 172). 
Johnson's article appears in a volume edited by Young, who provides a defence of 
Barthes by way of a preface, supplementing S/Z with the similar analysis of Poe's 
"Valdemar," which Barthes provides in Young's anthology. Young claims that the 
collapse of the realist narrative is conclusively demonstrated in Poe's "The Facts in the 
Case ofM. Valdemar," when the words "I am dead" are uttered by one of the characters, 
and Young observes that this "transgression is the moment when representation breaks 
down" (1981, 163). Young follows Barthes, stating that the tenor of the enunciation is 
incompatible with the conditions of its enunciation (1981, 163), which may only be 
accepted if the enunciation were not written, which the tern1 "enunciation" elides. For 
Young, realism and representation are equivocal (he writes of "an impossible 
representation, the breaking-point of realism" (1981, 163», and the erasure of writing 
from the scene of analysis leads Young to explain that the words of Valdemar erase the 
limit, life/death. The nature of "text" itself erases the limit between life and death, as 
Derrida notes (1982a, 24), and the general possibility of meaning is founded on the 
absence which the signification brings into being in representing presence. Derrida 
observes that "the statement 'I am alive' is accompanied by my being dead, and its 
possibility requires the possibility that I be dead; and conversely. This is not an 
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extraordinary tale by Poe but the ordinary story of language" (1973, 96-7). Barthes 
acknowledges Derrida's commentary, and states that his own concern is to "show that the 
unheard-of sentence 'I am dead' is in no way the unbelievable utterance, but much more 
radically the impossible enunciation" (1981b, 154). The "impossibility" of the 
enunciation is part of Derrida's analysis, which is not simply related to the believability 
of the statement, and he challenges the relationship between context and meaning. Rather 
than deny that the statement is impossible, Derrida points out that the enunciation is not 
represented in the text, and that the textual representation of the statement indicates that 
the enunciation is merely the theoretically privileged context of the signified presence as 
self-presence, in which meaning is apparently represented transparently by the spoken 
signifier. The conclusions regarding the enunciation of life and death are determined by 
Barthes as derivative from the states known as life and death. However, Derrida shows 
that the condition of being alive or dead is secondary to representation of those 
conditions, whereby the representation of life requires that life not be the prerequisite for 
its representation, and death could not be represented if it were pure absence; so, the 
possibility of being dead is the possibility of representing absence as presence in the text. 
3.3.1. Castration and Being-Castrated 
The complicity between form and presence in the logos implies that meaning is reducible 
to a simple origin; for example, the notion that language is the metaphorical transfer of 
meaning from one form to another also assumes that the space of the transfer is 
non-metaphorical (Derrida 1978, 303n.18). This non-metaphoricity is provided in the 
privilege given to the verb to be, which has a meaning simple and identical to the 
expression of its presence, similar to the privileged proximity of voice to thought. The 
notion that the sense impression of the word is elevated into the meaning implicitly 
recognises the form of the sense in terms of being; "all concepts of form refer back to 
presence in general" (Derrida 1973, 108). The unity of sense and meaning in the copula 
implies that such an elevation can never have taken place, but this implication is elided in 
the logical system of predication which perceives presence in form, and destines "all 
sense to meaning" (Derrida 1973, 127). Classically, the copula is the simple origin from 
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which presence as form provides the transfer of sense into the being-present of the word; 
however, Derrida challenges the absolute origin by demonstrating that its spacing 
includes difference within itself, and its signified is conferred by the differential system 
of meaning, rather than the privileged inscription from an originary force. By providing 
the non-metaphorical origin of being, the copula effects the closure of presence in the 
word by converting the relation of what is not a being-present "into an experience that has 
the form of being-present" (Derrida 1973, 124). The conversion of the limit case, where 
the being-present of the term absence becomes its being-absent, is the basis of Sarrasine, 
in which castration is transformed into being-castrated. The representation of lack in the 
text demonstrates not the collapse of representation but the persistence of meaning after 
the fundamental structure, connoted as providing stability, is fragmented. Therefore, the 
code is not the basic unit allowing the presence of meaning into the text, and the 
representation of the codes, by language, is revealed; so, although the code of opposition 
may collapse, the text itself does not. 
The Zambinellan body resists codification for a reason which Barthes claims 
ultimately causes the narrative contract to collapse: the characters are distributed around 
an axis of "castrating/castrated, active/passive" and not around biological sex (Barthes 
1974,36). Yet, Johnson observes that the presence of the castrato in the narrative must 
be taken as evidence that the narrative does not collapse and represents the meaning of the 
text, which Barthes closes with his interpretation of the breaking of the contract. The 
castrato, La Zambinella, cannot appear in the coded opposition from which each character 
is derived, and functions as the flaw in the system of oppositions. Narrative can 
manipulate codes of knowledge about castration, but the basis of the codes cannot be 
codified as the "presence" of meaning, since it divides the plenitudes and cannot be 
situated on anyone side of the opposition. Barthes views the antithetical coding of realist 
representation as the opposition of two pure forces, and elevates the opposition into the 
presence of meaning, which he then develops as pure textual force, stating that "meaning 
(and its classifying basis) is a question of life or death" (1974, 66). The influence of the 
figure of castration is such that "there is no longer any 'representation'" (Barthes 1974, 
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164), since the text narrates what cannot be coded by "making truth be anecdotally (and 
no longer symbolically) the absent phallus" (Barthes ibid.). The anecdotal castration, 
proposed by Barthes as the nature of Balzac's representation, displaces representation out 
of language and into realism, only to deny the representational capacity of the realist 
code, and then to state that the lack of coded castration is the demonstration of 
being-castrated. Absence is not unmediated by representation; as Derrida notes, the 
signification of presence necessarily requires the absence of the referent. Similarly, the 
being-castrated which Barthes discusses is not possible outside the realm of language: 
there can be no simple, non-metaphorical absence represented by the text. The meaning, 
being-castrated, is expressed in a non-binary signifying chain, so the text cannot be 
castrated of meaning, because it lacks an original plenitude. 
Barthes concludes that "Sarrasine represents the very confusion of representation" 
(1974, 215), in the story which represents two competing discourses, one of which is 
merely the elided extreme of the philosophical premise of the other: textual language is 
natural and transparent. Therefore, Sarrasine does not collapse, and the general economy 
of representation described by Barthes is merely the limited economy of realism. He 
states that the economy of language is "usually protected by the separation of opposites" 
(1974, 215), which may lead to the conclusion that he wishes to elevate code into 
language. The representation of the general Writing is not collapsed in the narrative. 
Barthes's elision of the letter from the scene of representation leads him to conclude that 
representation ceases when the code is ruptured at its origin, overlooking the fact that the 
origin of the code is not a pure, self-identical presence; that is, it is already "ruptured." 
3.3.2. The Presence Beyond the Code 
The text refers not from "language to a referent, but from one code to another" (Barthes 
1974, 55), which ultimately brings Barthes to place the coded object (for example, the 
body) in a position supplementary to the anterior Book, the idealised origin of the code. 
However, the body which cannot be coded in the novel must function there as a presence 
outside the realist discourse. The code may therefore become the reality of an alien form 
within the systematic totality of the novel. The separation of form and meaning in the 
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field of castration, Barthes explains, is demonstrated by the old man's body, which is 
"itself the semantic space - becoming meaning it becomes space" (Barthes 1974, 61) -
and this results in the body described becoming a supplementary meaning: "the figure is 
not the sum, the frame or the support of the meanings; it is an additional meaning, a kind 
of diacritical paradigm" (ibid.). The body of the castrato is impossible to write into the 
"natural" system of representation governing the text, so the entry of Zambinella exposes 
the field of meaning which the text exteriorises. The textual castration is limited to the 
signified realm, and the entry of the semantic space of the castrato's body demonstrates 
that the language of realist representation, and representation in general, does not have a 
simple origin. The basis of meaning, castration, is also divided within itself as form and 
meaning, so there is no origin that representation may cite which is not reducible to other 
originary criteria. Barthes comments that the Marquise's touching the old man at the 
party, "is indeed the eruption of the signifier into reality through the wall of symbolism: it 
is a psychotic act" (1974, 67) which involves the "physical contact between ... two 
completely separate substances" (ibid. 65), the discourses. The presence of the text's 
meaning as form is posited by Barthes because he associates the communication of 
meaning with the presence of the speaking subject. The origin of meaning is therefore 
not present in the text, and the presence cannot be the autonomous entity of the cogito, 
since it is mediated by the signified. The production of meaning via the code is the 
secondary representation which erases the textual inscription of the code. 
3.4. Communication and the Text 
Barthes, describing the text as a weave of voices, elides the graphic form if the signifier, 
and his example of the readerly voice, supplied to unify the codes of the narrative, 
originates from the notion that the text communicates, and that its codes are derived from 
communication itself. The emphasis on the voice, weaving together the strands of the 
text, is complicit with Barthes's approach to representation as a representation of 
presence; namely, the presence of the subject. In contrast, the communicable signified 
represents, for Derrida, the radical absence of the subject. Derrida's grapheme is 
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detached from all contexts of signification, "no context can enclose it. Nor can any code" 
(1982a, 317), and the iterability of the inscription is proof for Derrida that it is separated 
from all contexts of production and therefore from communication itself, as the transfer 
of the presence of meaning from sender to receiver. Barthes proposes communication in 
the text as a force independent of writing, in general, and then returns communication to 
the site of the narrative as its natural, structuring origin. 
Barthes does not deny the literary realm of the writing under examination, and he 
attempts to displace it out of the textual representation (the letter) in which it occurs. The 
signification of desire in the work is based on the literary, extra-textual structuration of 
"the - always anterior - Book and Code" (Barthes 1974, 73). The text is therefore 
subjected to a transcendental totalising structure, which has a position with regard to 
signification similar to that posited by Rousseau as the Book of Nature (Derrida 1976, 
15-16), a closure similar to the anteriority of the phallus in Lacan. The code is classified 
as a literary representation without its having to be written, and the text is constituted as a 
weave of voices which "form the writing" (Barthes 1974, 160) and relieve the constraints 
on the "mute" letter. Barthes theorises representation in terms of the code, and language 
as a meaningful exchange between codes. The letter is not inscribed with the trace of the 
voice, or conversely, because such would destroy the claims concerning the collapse of 
representation in the text. 
3.4.1. The Nature a/the Connoted Message 
The system of meaning incorporated in the readerly text is termed connotation, an 
"association made by the text-as-subject within its own system" (Barthes 1974, 8). 
Connotation in the novel, like that in the photograph, is naturalised by the denotation, but 
a further reflexive closure is possible for the novelistic codes of connotation and 
denotation: by connoting itself as the primary "fixed" level of meaning, the denoted elides 
the presence of the connoted by passing through it, bestowing on the clasical text an 
"innocence" of its duplicity (Barthes 1974,9). The "innocence" erases the "fallen" trace 
of the code in the text's realist representation, where the text "pretends to return to the 
nature of language, to language as nature" (Barthes 1974, 9). The effacement of the 
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nature of language is ascribed to the structure of the text and the force of the code, and 
Barthes fails to account for the representational nature of language in terms of the "mark". 
Signification is therefore placed under the closure of the work, and the structural erasure 
of the code elides the self-effacing trace of differance as the production of the system by 
the differential signifying chain. 
The nature of signification for Barthes is communication, in which the expression 
(E) forms a relation (R) with the content (C) to establish the sign (ERC), giving the 
formula for connotation as (ERC)RC (Barthes 1974, 7). The differentiation of 
signification into two systems, one based on the other, implies that each arises from a 
non-representational presence. The nature of the expression cannot be distinguished 
from the nature of the content except through the reduction of the denotation to an 
inherent presence in the text. Since the denotation is something which is being signified, 
rather than the sound itself, as Saussure's signifier is the sound-image, it cannot provide 
a plane of expression fundamental to connotation. Derrida explains that, for Saussure, 
"the sound-image is what is heard; not the sound heard but the being-heard of the sound" 
(1976,63). Representation is already a feature of the text, and the signification does not 
have an originary presence in the expression. The differential system of meaning which 
gives rise to the gramme, the mark, is detached from teleological orientation toward 
communication as a consequence of its being subject to repetition and re-iteration, so the 
text-as-subject does not have authority over an independent system. 
The narrative does not reside in the written form of the text, and Barthes's erasure of 
writing from the narrative scene produces a model of representation which requires a pure 
form of expression to be elevated into the signified meaning. Consequently, Barthes 
equates representation with the code, which generates its own context, so its economy is 
closed and interacts only with itself, it "has no object: ... the narrative tells itself' 
(Barthes 1974, 213). The self-sufficient context has either no significance, or is an 
encompassing, totalising context. Barthes suggests the latter when he writes that the 
narrative takes the form of a contract, for which the narrative provides the economy of the 
exchange: "one narrates to obtain by exchanging; and it is this exchange that is 
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represented in the narrative itself" (Barthes 1974, 89). The contract provides a textual 
"simultaneity," toward which all parts of the text move and which is present in, and 
recoverable from, all parts of the text. The conceptualisation of the text as a form, which 
represents, leads to the form being summarised as a spatial and total meaning. The 
resulting notion of meaning as the space of the text closes the meaning in the context of 
the work, and allows meaning to be thought as the work's presence; however, meaning 
and textual space cannot be simply derived from each other. 
3.5. Meaning, Structure, Desire 
An encounter between Zambinella and Sarrasine produces a section of dialogue in which 
each "line is a snare, a misuse, and each misuse is justified by a code" (Barthes 1974, 
154). Barthes describes that the exchange gives rise to the "scene" where codes are 
exchanged as they are "hurled back and forth" in the operation of the contract, and his 
description of the code's misuse implies an originary, irreducible context for each code. 
Formulating the text's functioning as the contract of exchange, Barthes displaces the 
traditional critical argument relating to form and meaning, by denying the significance of 
meaning and expressing form as desire. The desire expressed in the "scene" is the need 
of each side for the other. Effectively, the "scene" manifests desire as a binary 
opposition. For Lacan, desire situates the Other in the locus of the signifier, but 
Barthes's model places the desiring subjects on either side of the signifier, since each has 
an irreducible discursive origin. Textual desire is structurally opposed to meaning by 
Barthes, yet the signified itself expresses lack, so desire cannot be displaced out of the 
signifying chain as the conflict between opposing discourses. The exchange ends with 
the last word, and the goal of each discourse is to have that last word; the "scene" has no 
meaning: its significance is in the pleasure of the exchange, prolonging a potentially 
infinite round of mutual recognition in language, so the end of the exchange is the only 
measure of significance, and the last word is of the highest order of significance (Barthes 
1978,204-9). The codes confront each other with the force of their systematisation, and 
where there is a coded "protocol of results" (Barthes 1974, 155) the stronger force will 
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subvert the systematics of the other by appropriating them into its larger field of meaning. 
Barthes's theory that the "scene" has no meaning undermines his own claims of the 
signification of the code, since the misuse of a code depends on the closure of its 
signifying context; the code is therefore not the fundamental signifying force in the text. 
Furthermore, the systematisation of the code is an example of Barthes's theoretical model 
erasing one aspect of signification in the text, only to return it at a later stage as the 
derivative of the structure which erases it. The "force of meaning depends on its degree 
of systematisation" (1974, 154), Barthes writes; however, the separation of meaning 
from its force implies that pure meaning and pure structure exist separately from each 
other. Desire is evoked by lack, not structural opposition, and Barthes's formulation of 
language as code provides the structural context for him to displace meaning out of 
language and replace it with coded desire. 
3.6. Desire and Code: The Function of Myth 
in Barthes: Conclusions 
Barthes's notion of representation locates the meaning of the text in the social discourse, 
the doxa, on the topic denoted. The code must be recognised by the reader, and the 
Symbolic function it has in the text is that of objectification in recognition, so the desire 
which Barthes claims the code expresses in the narrative contract may be inverted, to 
claim that Barthes has collapsed the desire for meaning which identifies the code and 
defined it in terms of desire as meaning. The structure of the code, as a signifying 
whole, is derived from the Lacanian points de capitan, and Barthes's application of the 
concept to the written or visual text also follws Lacan in erasing the letter from the scene 
of representation, and analysing the text as if it were spoken. 
The code refers to the "already written" without being written itself, or experiencing 
the distortions of mediation, Barthes's analysis implies. He interprets the realist novel by 
presenting the realist code as a privileged form of representation, and he subjects other 
forms of representation to evaluation through the criteria of representation in the novel. 
Communication is posited as the teleological nature of the code, and Barthes erases the 
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mediation of the code in his assessment of its meaning. The code is idealised in Barthes, 
which inevitably leads to the reconstitution of a basic form, from which it is elevated, and 
the context which provides this is the traditional privileging of speech. Communication is 
described in terms of the spoken utterance, despite the fact that it may be a written 
utterance which is under consideration. 
The production of meaning in the text results from the field of knowledge being 
objectified in the text by the subject. The doxa therefore replaces the mediation of 
language by providing a plenitude which the text represents. The text represents absence 
of meaning, however; and of Barthes's proposal concerning textual desire rein scribes the 
Lacanian centrisms. Desire and meaning are the effects of the signified absence, 
produced by the "presence" of the signified. Absence does not require an auxiliary 
structure, such as myth or the points de capiton, to provide a theoretical account of 
signification. Such attempts produce a topology of castration, and elide the differential 
medium of the signifying chain. 
4.1. Introduction 
4 
Representation 
in Cinema 
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The distinction Barthes makes between the photographic still and the motion picture 
relates to the temporal element of the representation. The photograph, he claims, 
represents the having-been-there of the thing, whereas the cinema presents its 
being-there. Furthermore, his "new space-time" category is assigned an hallucinatory 
appeal, while the cinematic image, it is felt, "is simply an illusion" (1981a, 117). The 
photographic signified is given extensive treatment, by Barthes, with respect to its 
mutational economy, and his analysis works within the presupposition of a temporal 
exterior, to which the signified may be related. Critical discussions about cinematic 
signification generally acknowledge that the analogical reproduction of the object is not 
proof of the signified's origin, yet the analogical representation is not frequently 
challenged with questions about the original temporality of the filmic representation. 
Attempts at mediating in cinematic representation, to disrupt the closure of mythical 
signifieds, have concentrated on the perceptibility of the apparatus and editing as the 
means to subvert the nature of "presence" in the image. However, such notions focus on 
an abstract plane of representation, governed by structural analysis and preconceptions 
about the influence of the technical aspects of production on the plenitude of the image. 
The general nature of signification itself is not questioned. 
That is, the cinematic image is not simply an illusion. It is inscribed with a 
non-simple origin in the erasure of differance, which makes possible the basic perception 
of the photograph as the freezing of an instant in time, and the interpretation of cinema as 
the unfreezing of the temporal continuum. The following analysis of the motion picture 
examines the influence of the projection of the image on the critical beliefs concerning the 
signification of the image. The cinematic projection may therefore be compared with the 
production of meaning in speech, and the metaphysical conclusions drawn from the 
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privileged context of the utterance, in erasing the mediation of the signifier. 
The erasure of cinematic mediation may be partially disrupted at the level of narrative 
through editing style. For example, the devices which traditionally frame "the woman" 
as spectacle in mainstream cinema may be parodied, and their elisions exposed. Such 
devices are not fundamental to the signification of cinema, however, and a more 
extensive intrusion into the closure of cinematic signification must expose the production 
of the signified, and the relationship it has with the analogical recording. Desperately 
Seeking Susan is selected as an example of mainstream film which is critical of the 
traditional representation of women in cinema narrative, since it draws attention to the 
mediation of film in the production of the signified. Susan, the character played by 
Madonna, is fragmented by the ambiguous nature of Madonna's representation, since in 
one section she appears visually as Susan and aurally as Madonna. The Symbolic, 
differential origin of the femininity embodied by Madonna is evoked by the carnivalesque 
transformation of her appearance, and the resulting gender ambiguity displaces the 
phallus from central position in the signification of desire. 
4.2. The Cinematic Signifier 
The recording process of film and video requires the presence of light, which leads some 
theorists to suggest that the signification in cinema is founded on the opposition of light 
and dark, or, as Brunette claims, the "presence and absence of light" (1986, 61). The 
opposition of light and dark is not differential, and the "presence" of light in this context 
is not the presence of the signified, but is the transcendental notion of self-presentation; 
the presence of light may be aligned with the sound-image signifier in Saussure, which 
involves the being-heard, or being-seen, of the medium, and is not a pure experience of 
the signifier. The signification of the image is elided in critical discussion which moves 
directly from consideration of the photological nature of film to the formal nature of the 
shot. 
The cinematic signified is an effect of the differential signifying chain, and cinematic 
projection provides a context in which the signified presence of the image elides its 
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representational status, and allows appraisal of the recording as an originary continuum. 
Barthes's temporal hallucination in the photograph is founded on the inseparability of 
mark and production; and, in relation to the motion picture, the photograph may be held 
as "the non-present remaining of a differential mark cut off from its alleged 
'production,'" which Derrida provides as an account for the exteriorisation of the letter 
(1982a, 318). The cinematic image is not "marked" in the manner of the photograph, 
since the projection elides the moment of production and temporality associated with the 
image. The photograph and the cinematic image are not simply reducible to the signifier 
and signified of the Saussurian sign, which "carries within itself the necessity of 
privileging the phonic substance" (Derrida 1987b, 21). Saussure's sign is structured in 
complicity with the context of its posited origin, the spoken utterance. So, cinematic 
signification (and signification in general) is not inherently tracable to basic structures, 
and the attempt to theorise such structures results in the privileging of specific contexts, 
as I discuss below with regard to Metz and Mulvey. The apparent transparency of the 
signifier, which in speech is perceived as the unveiling of thought, assigns a continuous 
presence to the objects signified in the image. The motion in the image appears to signify 
the temporal continuity of Real presence; however, the critical analyses of temporality in 
cinema often assume that temporality is something other than an integral part of 
signification. The meaning of the temporality of the image is explored as something, 
which, having been unveiled by the transparency of the signifier, is hidden by the 
signified. The signified is therefore placed in a position derivative from a fundamental 
presence. 
4.2.1. The Experience of Time 
The experience of duration is critically represented as something which is veiled in the 
viewer's absorption in cinema. However, the nature of "experience" must be questioned, 
for the image is not simply seen, but is being-seen as an already mediated structure. The 
signification of film is not localised in the moment of experience, because "experience" is 
complicit with the metaphysics of the sign, to the "extent that it [experience] is not 
separated from the field of the mark" (Derrida 1982a, 318). Experimental work related to 
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the duration of the film projection is often complicit with the displacement of temporality 
from the scene of representation into a transcendental category. A film by Le Grise 
(1973), White Field Duration, attempts, Heath notes, to "establish the length of 
projection time as a material experience by exposing the viewer to a white screen" (1981, 
166). The exploration of duration in the work is a repetition of the structuralist analysis 
of the total space of the book, since Heath states that the reduction of the cinema to light 
and screen is a reduction to "the very limits of its physical supports," (1981, 170) which 
is equivalent to the elevation of temporality out of signification in order to state that the 
meaning of a work may be summarised by its duration. Any attempt to translate the 
signification of meaning into a spatial or temporal form merely suppresses the effect 
which is being sought; as Derrida explains, "to comprehend the structure of a becoming, 
the form of a force, is to lose meaning by finding it" (1978, 26). The delineation of form 
and space erases the necessity of meaning's expression as form, and does not recognise 
that the work is a totality, within a differential context. That is, the work cannot be 
fragmented and summarised within the context of its autonomous structure, for such 
would elide the general scene of representation and ascribe the origin of the signification 
to an idealisation of the text. Therefore, because meaning cannot be extracted from the 
form of the work, films such as Le Grise's do not expose a fundamental aspect of 
cinematic signification. 
Duration may be acknowledged in the discussion of a narrative. Yet, duration is not 
a continuum of full presence, so it has no inherent quality which allows it to provide 
closure in analysis. The event recorded on film has no inherent durational plenitude, and 
duration is the mediation of meaning. The temporal nature of cinema is not derived from 
a temporal plenitude outside the projection. The slow motion sequence exposes the 
discontinuity between the duration of projection and the originary duration, whereby both 
are placed in a secondary relationship to the mediation of the signified. The continuity of 
duration may be challenged by relating the projection to the production of speech. 
Derrida shows that the signified is an effect of spacing, so the deferral of autonomous 
presence in the signified means that in speech the signifying chain is not present as a pure 
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temporal continuum. 
4.2.2. Discontinuity and the Shot Boundary 
The shot is perceived by most critics as a homogeneous unit, marked by discontinuity at 
its boundaries (both spatial and temporal), and the significance of the boundary is elided. 
The shot is therefore categorised by the opposition of inside and outside, in which the 
discontinuity of the representation is elided by the continuous "presence" within the shot. 
The significance of the disruption of the shot boundary is erased by the "presence" of the 
shot, as the margin effaces its "secondary" position by presenting the shot. The 
indispensibility of the shot boundary may be compared with Derrida's description of the 
effect of the tympanic membrane, which allows sounds to be heard by disrupting their 
transmission. The unity of the shot is not merely a structural concern for critics, for the 
presence of the image as shot is related to the ideological "interior" of cinema: the 
representation of continuous presence. 
Heath comments, in the context of a discussion on the conflict between continuity of 
action in the narrative and continuity of space in the shot, that "classically continuity is 
built on fragmentation rather than the long take," (1981, 43). The notion of 
fragmentation is described by Heath in a manner which suggests that the film medium 
transparently fragments the space which it signifies, and that the signification of unified 
space is not dependent on the inherent fragmentation of the shot. That is, the possibility 
of introducing the shot boundary implies that the shot originates through discontinuity, so 
the "exterior" discontinuity cannot be excluded from the "interior" presence. The shot 
has no fundamental state of repleteness; rather, it is discontinuous at each "instant" of its 
signifying continuous presence. The nature of the inside/outside opposition is not 
primary, because it arises through the differential signification, which ultimately indicates 
that the shot cannot be privileged as the fundamental unit of meaning in cinema. The 
exterior and interior of the shot, and the marking of the exterior by the boundary, are of 
equal significance. 
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4.3. Cinema and Vision 
Both Metz and Mulvey focus on the specular nature of the cinematic image, while failing 
to examine the criteria upon which they judge the nature of the specular. Mulvey operates 
from the privileged context of the look, and she relates that it is "the place of the look that 
defines cinema" (1985, 314). An investigation into their theories shows that they both 
use privileged contexts which displace the film medium from a general scene of 
representation and into a closed order of meaning. For example, Mulvey claims that the 
spectacle of "the woman" in narrative has a disruptive effect on continuity, ultimately 
taking the film in which it occurs "into a no-man's-land outside its own time and space" 
(1985, 309). The time and space of film according to Mulvey is mediated for the 
spectator by the gaze of the principal, masculine character. So, in the collapse of 
narrative with the appearance of the spectacle, the "erotic image appears directly (without 
mediation) to the spectator" (Mulvey 1985, 314). The analysis of spectacle in terms of 
the male gaze, relayed through the main protagonist, closes the field of inquiry, and 
places the nature of the film as medium in a position secondary to the controlling gaze. 
Furthermore, the nature of the gaze and the look is not explicitly examined, and does not 
include Lacan's differentiation of the visual field into functions of the gaze and the eye. 
Lacan notes that the subject's visual environment is "the spectacle of the world" (1979, 
75), so the nature of spectacle is not restricted to the feminine appearance, although Lacan 
refers to the lure of the gaze in the phallocentric context of the veil as feminine desire for 
the phallus. Specific examples are drawn from Desperately Seeking Susan, in order to 
demonstrate that the object under the gaze cannot be privileged as a feature of the medium 
or dominant cinematic practice, since neither are fundamental signifying units. 
4.3.1. The Mirror Scene 
Metz bases his notion of signification in film on the Lacanian mirror stage, and he 
describes the stage as a necessary step in the subject's ability to understand film, for it is 
associated with the entry into the Symbolic. However, Metz extends the significance of 
vision in the entry into language, and constructs an allegorical scenario which effectively 
incorporates the technical processes of cinematic projection into the functioning of the 
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Symbolic. The signifying chain in cinema, according to Metz, "depends on a series of 
mirror-effects organised in a chain, and not on a single reduplication" (1985, 790). The 
privilege bestowed on the mirror as site of cinematic representation elides film's 
Symbolic nature, and the Symbolic is confined within the presence of the subject, on the 
basis that the subject initially provides the source of the reflection in the mirror. In the 
case of the gaze directed at the screen, Metz writes, "the film is what I receive, and it is 
also what I release, since it does not pre-exist my entering the auditorium and I need only 
close my eyes to suppress it" (1985, 790). The subject's recognition of the objects on 
the screen, as a projection of the subject in the objet a, does require the presence of the 
subject for the act of recognition, however, the presence of the subject is not the 
fundamental origin of the recognition, which is produced by the differential signifying 
chain. The subject therefore releases the signified of the image, as Metz states, but the 
effect pre-exists the subject's entry into the cinema, and is not simply suppressed by 
interrupting the gaze directed at the screen. Experience, as Derrida notes, is complicit 
with the mark, so the possibility of experience indicates that the cinematic signifier has a 
signifying structure which is exterior to the subject, which Metz recognises in the 
Symbolic but then displaces by privileging the specular scene of the mirror. 
The idealistic chaining of mirrors erases the effect of differance and reduces the 
signification of cinema to the reflective presence of the mirror; from which, Metz posits 
the presence and absence of the object in transcendental terms of self-presentation: the 
mirror of the screen is not "a 'purely' symbolic-imaginary site, for the absence of the 
object and the codes of the absence are really produced in it by the physis of an 
equipment" (1985, 796). The emphasis on the mirror leads Metz to suggest that while 
the objects represented in cinema (reflected in its mirror) are absent, the mirror of the 
screen is itself present, as is the gaze, as the structure supporting the representation, in 
the spectator's identification with the camera. For the desire expressed in the scopic 
drives to be communicated in cinema, the gaze cannot be outside the Symbolic, and 
cannot be relayed between character and spectator as if it were an object. The Symbolic 
aspect of the gaze requires it to be imagined in the field of the Other, and it is not 
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something which is seen, Lacan states. In Metz's description, the gaze is itself 
meaningful, and is not simply the locus through which meaning is relayed; therefore, the 
gaze cannot be separated from the scene of representation, since meaning indicates the 
mediation of the Symbolic. Metz's mirror is formulated as the site upon which the gaze 
is cast, making his theory complicit with an erasure of the mediation of the 
representation. 
4.4. Textual Opacity in Desperately Seeking Susan 
In the analysis of mainstream film narrative, theorists such as Mulvey acknowledge 
features specific to cinematic representation, such as the gaze, but generally evaluate 
narrative an abstract frame. The abstraction elides the mediation of the signified by the 
film medium, and features of narrative are naturalised as transparent aspects of the film 
signification. The naturalisation follows phallocentric reasoning and presents "the 
woman" as the transparent site of the representation of desire in narrative, and the 
masculine character's gaze as the transparent expression of masculine desire. 
Desperately Seeking Susan presents difficulties for cinema criticism such as 
Mulvey's, because its narrative lacks a central masculine protagonist, and conventional 
narrative devices are incorporated in a disjunctive, parodic manner. The characterisation 
of the two women, Susan and Roberta, and the relationship between them is not merely 
the result of placing females in parts conventionally played by males. The enigma of 
femininity, a traditional narrative topic in various media, is exposed for critical 
examination in Desperately Seeking Susan, since the narrative mediation of the enigma as 
spectacle is presented from a perspective with the traditional object as subject. The 
representation of desire is therefore shown as a Symbolic effect, in which the mediation 
is elided so the signified appears to be derived from a plenitude, traditionally "the 
woman." The character of Susan embodies many mythical feminine traits, and the film 
represents Susan as a figure constructed in the scene of representation, rather than from a 
simple origin; which is a movement toward the non-essentialist interpretation of 
representation. 
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The following analysis discusses the film's presentation of the Symbolic origin of 
meaning. Although the Lacanian terminology may have logocentric foundations, it is 
used for compatibility with the psychoanalytical work of Mulvey and Metz, and the 
"Symbolic" is a useful label, since it describes the subject's irreversible entry into 
language and the mediation of the Real by the signifying chain. Desperately Seeking 
Susan is found to present an artificial narrative "space," in which the textual issues of 
authority and meaning, as I discuss in the work of Kolbowski and Sherman, draw the 
fllm medium into the scene of representation. The effect is not merely a reflexive gesture, 
which would discuss cinema transparently through the cinema; rather, the nature of 
meaning is problematised in visual and linguistic contexts, as well as in relation to 
cinematic narrative conventions. The issues of representation in the narrative are 
analysed here as issues under mediation, so the conclusions drawn from them relate to 
their being represented in the film medium. That is, the cinematic scene is a constraint on 
the discussion of the representation of "the woman," rather than a privileged point of 
access. There is no scene outside the limitations encountered, merely different scenes in 
different media, and which all refer back to Derrida's general scene of Writing. 
4.4.1. Narrative Outline 
The following is a general description of the relationships between characters and events, 
and is intended to contextualise the individual segments of discussion on the film's 
narrative in the main body of the text. Desperately Seeking Susan uses many 
conventional narrative structures, so it appears in the outline as a rather traditional film. 
The points of interest occur in the fllm's deviance within the conventions of mainstream 
cinema, and the deviations are presented in my general discussion, which elaborates 
many of the theoretical issues raised in previous chapters. 
The opening of the film shows Roberta in a beauty salon, in New York. The 
following section is in Atlantic City, and shows Susan in an expensive hotel suite, where 
she is lying on the floor, taking self-portraits with a polaroid camera. The narrative 
ensues from the confusion which results when the identities of Susan and Roberta are 
mistaken by Nolan (a criminal) and Des (a friend of Susan's boyfriend, Jim), after 
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Roberta loses her memory while in possession of some items which belonged to Susan, 
namely a distinctive jacket. Susan is detained by the police after she is unable to pay the 
cab fare for her ride to collect her belongings from Roberta, thereby allowing the 
narrative to become complicated as the mistaken identities are left unrealised for those 
concerned. Roberta's husband (Gary, a spa pool retailer) traces Roberta's actions 
leading up to her disappearance, and eventually locates Susan, who is unwilling to help 
because she thinks Roberta is collaborating with Nolan. A farcical chase scene which 
resolves the confusion between the characters occurs at a magic club where Susan 
arranges a meeting with Roberta after realising that Nolan is actually associated with 
Bruce (his accomplice in a jewelry theft) with whom she shared the hotel room in Atlantic 
City. 
Susan and Jim frequently correspond through the personal column of a newspaper 
called The Mirror, which Roberta reads, recording their exchanges in her diary. 
Roberta's interest in their adventures leads her to attempt to identify them at the meeting 
when Susan returns from Atlantic City before Jim leaves town. After the meeting 
Roberta follows Susan and obtains the jacket which Susan exchanges for some boots in a 
second hand shop. Having found a key in the jacket pocket, Roberta tries to contact 
Susan through the newspaper. Jim is suspicious when he sees Roberta's message, 
signed "A Stranger," because Susan has told him that the man she was with in Atlantic 
City has just been killed (presumably by his accomplice, Nolan, for being unable to 
produce the stolen Egyptian earrings which Susan "innocently" pocketed when she left 
him sleeping in the hotel room). Jim, who is away from New York with a rock band, 
asks Des to go to the meeting which Roberta has arranged at the Battery Park waterfront. 
Des has not previously met Susan, so Jim describes her over the telephone, and the 
description occurs as voice-over, while the camera shows Roberta dressing and making 
herself up as Susan. The descriptions match, and Roberta is shown reflected in a mirror, 
along with Susan's polaroid self-portrait, which was in the jacket, along with a key and 
Des's telephone number. 
Roberta loses her memory after striking her head on a pole, and Des, thinking she is 
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Susan, takes her back to his apartment, because he promised Jim, that he would look 
after her. Nolan, who causes Roberta's injury follows them, and the confusion and 
pursuit continues. Roberta regains her memory when she strikes her head a second time 
after being chased from the magic club by Nolan. When she rings Gary, he and Susan 
are stoned, so she rings Des and decides not to return to Gary, and continues working at 
the Magic Box. 
4.4.2. Typology and Desire: The Language Barrier 
Desperately Seeking Susan presents the characters' interaction with the representation of 
desire, and shows that the media and language prove a barrier to the expression and 
satisfaction of desire, rather than of assistance in its pursuit. The object of desire, when 
held in idealist terms by a character, is lost when mediated by language, and the reason 
for the desire becomes unclear. Traditionally, the object of desire is clearly marked off 
from the other characters, and the feminine apparel and cosmetic spectacle are utilised as 
transparent signifiers, since "the woman" is also the object of desire. The classical 
cinema typology of the feminine object as a transparent locus of desire is placed in a 
problematic position when Des tries to help Roberta regain her memory by filling her in 
on Susan's past, and gives a description of Jim. The verbal description may also be 
applied to him; Roberta realises the similarity, kisses Des, and then apologises. The 
origin of the desire is located in the representation of the object, since Susan/Roberta's 
desire is displaced onto Des on the basis of the description. The naturalisation of desire 
by "the woman" is lost when the object of the description is male, so the representation of 
the object is fore grounded as the locus of desire, rather than originating from an essential 
presence of the object. 
Susan travels by cab to the meeting advertised by Roberta, and while Susan is 
putting on make-up, the cab driver's monologue parQdies the mythical status of the New 
York cabbie as a repository of trivia and public knowledge (doxa). The speech utterances 
of the driver are circular and contradictory, and he states his taste in food, which he bases 
on the name of the item rather than its taste. He tells Susan that everyone, these days, 
goes for Sushi. He expresses his distaste for "the stuff," and then comments: "Although 
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I'll tell you I had some the other day. I took it home, I cooked it. It wasn't bad. It tasted 
like fish. " The cab scene is significant because the driver's opinions are ordered by the 
Symbolic, rather than his experience with the Real. The social order of representation, 
under the name of the law, is implicitly assigned a differential origin in the Symbolic, 
rather than the transcendental concept of justice; when the driver states, as Susan is 
detained, "I know the law," his knowledged is based on the representation of the law, 
and the decentring of the Symbolic indicates that the law does not fundamentally 
transcend representation. 
4.4.3. The Veil and the Other 
Kolbowski challenges the signification of desire in cosmetic ornamentation by disrupting 
the closure of the masculine gaze. In Desperately Seeking Susan, the cosmetic is 
acknowledged as a signifier of desire, but the object of desire is not closed in a 
phallogocentric context. The visual codes of mainstream cinema are appropriated in the 
fIlm, to demonstrate that they are not inherent signifiers of masculine desire. Entering the 
film as a transient, non-localised Symbolic figure, Madonna subverts the realism of the 
conventional narrative. 
The masquerade, which Lacan interprets as the desire to connote the veiling of the 
phallus, is displaced by Susan's signification of desire in the lure of "the image," because 
the signifiers have no stable context in which to elide their presence. The veil of 
cosmetics is represented in the film's opening section, in the beauty salon, where it is 
objectified on the female body (facial cosmetics are tested on the hand) without the 
context allowing it to objectify the female body itself, and Lacan's essentialist association 
of the veiling signifier with castration is replaced with its representation as a signifier in a 
differential system, with no central lack. Susan's relationship with the woman working 
as magician's assistant at the Magic Box is presented as an enigma, which has greater 
significance than predication in the context of mainstream cinema which elides the lesbian 
potential in relationships between women. Susan invites herself to her friend's 
apartment, and at the apartment there is a shot of Susan's friend painting her toenails. 
The shot, similar to one in the opening sequence in the salon, disrupts pre-emptory 
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conclusions that in either context the makeup is being applied for male satisfaction. The 
ambiguity in the context of the application of the cosmetics does not allow the practice to 
embody the essence of any particular gender, and to show that desire in the decentred 
subject is a structural phenomenon, in which the Other has no inherent restriction on the 
object within its locus. The application of the cosmetics in different contexts indicates 
that the signification is void of communicative substance, and the traditional notion of 
transparency is a phallogocentric closure. 
The physical appearance of Madonna does not represent the external form of a stable 
internal essence, since she assembles garments, mythically imbued with femininity, in 
contradictory arrangements. Fiske notes that "combining the crucifix with the signs of 
pornography is a carnivalesque profanity," which challenges the iconicity of the items, 
and emptys them of significance (1987a, 252-3). The synchronic conflict within each set 
of garments is augmented and prevented from being quantified as a stable form of 
inversion by Madonna's constant permutation of apparel; she often changes before the 
camera in public space without connoting the revelation of a bodily essence underneath, 
because her use of undergarments as outerpieces subverts the impression that layers are 
being removed and that the revelation entails "truth." The transition in Madonna's 
representation prevents the arbitrary signifier from signifying in a closed context, and 
from essentialising the representation since nothing inherently feminine is represented. 
Gender identity is disrupted in Madonna's image, and the resulting connotation is the 
refusal to acknowledge essentialising codes by disrupting their "fundamental" production 
of meaning. 
4.4.4. The Logic of the Signifier 
Among Susan's belongings, Roberta (with memory loss) finds the photograph of a neon 
sign for a club called the Magic Box, and goes there in the hope of finding more about 
her past; she arrives shortly after Susan's friend is sacked (for insubordination rather than 
incompetence), and is offered the position, which she accepts. The "natural" 
objectification of the female body for the pleasure of the male gaze is inverted in the 
scenes performed by Roberta as magician's assistant. Roberta's incompetence has no 
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detrimental effect on the enthusiasm of the male spectators, while the women in the 
audience shown no satisfaction from the spectacle. Before she is replaced, Susan's 
friend complains that she cannot perform the tricks because she is not allowed to wear her 
glasses; and the process through which she arrives in the locus of spectacle replicates the 
Lacanian logic of the phallus: she is a spectacle in that she does not have her own 
(spectacles), as the mother's desire is the phallus because she does not have it. The 
representation of "the woman" as spectacle collapses the signifier and signified by 
combining spectacle and spectacles, respectively, and replicates the "determined 
situation," for which Derrida criticises Lacan; that is, the use of the male body to provide 
the penis as the symbol for the phallus, and as what the mother does not have. Lacan's 
inscription of the female body with the criteria for the natural Other is subverted when the 
phallocentric terminology is displaced by that centred on the gaze. The representation of 
sexual difference by the displaced signifier is an arbitrary distinction, governed by 
cultural constraints on the wearing of glasses on stage; and the synonymous use of penis 
and phallus to determine sexual difference is revealed as a phallogocentric grounding of 
the Symbolic. Through Roberta, the text appropriates the secondary position of assistant 
and transforms it into a display of control and skill, which is appreciated by everyone in 
the audience at the later performance, except Gary, who cannot see past his own 
representation of Roberta as a domestic housewife. 
The position of spectacle, which Roberta fills proficiently, is detached from the 
associations of the passive objectification of an essential femininity for the male gaze, and 
the performance is represented as a Symbolic act, which is "outside" the subject of its 
presentation. That is, the authority over the work or performance piece is not presented 
in terms of the classical authorial closure, and the scene's basis on the "spectacle" causes 
the film to present its own opacity, since the narrative is not halted or transparently 
subjected to distortions in its time and space. The film may be analysed differently from 
Mulvey's suggestion by arguing that the spectacle has no special position outside the 
narrative, and that claims such as Mulvey'S are restrictive in the possibilities which they 
allow film representation, since they elide the representation of the look as it occurs in 
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cinema. Mulvey implies that the voyeuristic image involves a pure act of seeing. 
However, representation is not elided by the signified, which could not be determined 
without mediation. The position held by Roberta suggests that there is no ideal spectator, 
because the film represents the pleasure of both men and women in the audience. The 
significant point of the scene relates to the lack of transparency in the image of the 
spectacle, and the removal of an essentialist form of authorial closure in the performance. 
4.5. Narrative Transparency and "The Woman" 
The photographs Susan takes of herself in the hotel have a status similar to the film-still 
simulacra in which Sherman photographs herself in the guise of "the woman" from the 
B-grade genre. Because Susan is the photographer, she is neither simply the object nor 
the subject of the representation, and she selects a photograph to keep as an accessory, 
rather like a piece of jewelry or a garment. Classically, the object of the photograph is 
"the woman," as Cook and Johnston discuss in "The Place of Woman in the Cinema of 
Raoul Walsh." Cook and Johnston show that female characters in films by Walsh are 
often mistakenly categorised by critics as strong, independent women, when they are 
actually trapped as signs within a system of exchange representing patriarchal values. 
They claim, "woman is not only a sign in a system of exchange, but an empty sign" 
(1985,381). The narrative function ofthe image of "the woman" in relation to masculine 
desire is the representation of lack through castration, which Cook and Johnston explain 
in Lacanian terms. They cite Mamie Stover, in The Revolt of Mamie Stover, as the 
example of a woman who takes control of the narrative, until its economic force 
ultimately reasserts itself, by gaining financial control over the circulation of the fetishised 
image of herself as "the woman" (1985, 383). The lack represented by "the woman" is 
reappraised in Desperately Seeking Susan, and the photographic images do not ultimately 
reinscribe the character into the partiarchal values because the image is placed outside the 
circulation which Cook and Johnston attribute to a central lack outside the scene of 
representation. The images of Susan are inscribed with lack at the level of the differential 
signifying chain, and the mediation of the image disrupts the narrative fetishisation which 
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traps the female characters in Walsh. By presenting the nature of the production of the 
image, Desperately Seeking Susan, decentres representation, and resists the inscription of 
the image with patriarchal values. Cook and Johnston's analysis is problematic in that 
the theoretical transparency of the image as fetish within the narrative allows critics to 
state that the nature of the image is transparent for the fIlm audience, and raises problems 
for the theorisation of a feminist fIlm practice which may escape the closed representation 
they hypothesise. In the narrative, by presenting the mediation in the production of the 
image, and the detachment of authorial presence from the signified of the image, the 
nature of the image presented to the audience is foregrounded, and the narrative cannot 
elide its mediation. Such elision is the case when Cook and Johnston state that Mamie 
Stover ultimately "remains trapped within the diegetic space which the fIlm has allotted to 
her" (1985, 383). In Desperately Seeking Susan, the diegetic space is presented as 
artificial, so its ability to trap or present reality is negated. 
Roberta is represented through photographs which proliferate contradictory 
statements about her identity, and demonstrate that the photographic representation has no 
validity as a transparent representation. Although the wedding photograph of Roberta 
allows the police to realise they have apprehended her as a suspected prostitute, the mug 
shot represents the extreme opposite of the wedding image. The police endeavour to 
hand Roberta over to Gary, her husband; however, she contacts Des and he bails her out 
before Gary arrives. So, the law and patriarchal ownership are introduced as the 
controlling force in the Symbolic realm (the conflicting images of Roberta are placed 
under the one identity by the police), but the detachment of Roberta from her 
representation allows her to remain outside its complete control. Roberta's position as 
performer at the Magic Box is distinguished from the nature of the position previously 
held by Susan's friend, because Roberta's photograph does not appear in the 
"performing tonight" display after the photograph of Susan's friend is removed. The 
absence is one of lack, and the lack is that of representation rather than the figure of "the 
woman" as signifier of castration. 
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4.5.1. Madonna/Susan and the Symbolic 
Classically, a star would perfonn in the guise of a character, and the material perfonned 
would be ascribed to the character played by the star, so musical material incorporated 
from outside the narrative would be appropriated by the character, to provide a unified 
origin for the perfonnance. Madonna is the star figure in Desperately Seeking Susan, so 
the performance of her music is a site where the unity of the narrative is potentially 
fragmented. In fact, the film utilises Madonna's star presence to rupture the unity of its 
representation, and to draw attention to the nature of "the woman" as spectacle. The 
performance of Madonna's "Into the Groove" occurs in the naturalised setting of a disco, 
where Gary is meeting Susan in order to track down Roberta, since the shop attendant, 
who sells Susan's jacket to Roberta, tells Gary that Susan returned looking for her key 
and has left a contact number. As Gary enters the disco, Susan is standing next to a 
jukebox, which is presumably the source of the soundtrack. However, Madonna and 
Susan are "co-present" in the scene, because Madonna appears as both the character 
Susan (to whom the jukebox selection may be attributed, although the multiple 
representation simultaneously disrupts the notion of causality) and she occurs in the 
soundtrack as Madonna, and no attempt is made by the Susan character to assimilate 
Madonna's music. 
The multiple position occupied by Madonna raises questions about the nature of the 
persona she represents, and the representational status of the music and film associated 
with her identity is also challenged. Madonna's origin is the Symbolic realm of film and 
media myth about women, and essentialist closure of her identity is prevented by the 
dynamic construction of her image. The real Madonna both enters the scene and is erased 
from it, in a style similar to the problematic of subject/object in Sherman's B-grade 
film-still simulacra, since the film incorporates visual and acoustic signifieds with 
different origins. The mediation of the film and soundtrack is exposed, and the origin of 
the representation is categorised as a differential phenomenon, dependent on its 
representation for isolation. The representation of "the woman" in the classical spectacle 
elides its mediation by unifying the performance in the origin of its presentation, while 
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Madonna's figure is displaced from the Real into the Symbolic, by representing the 
mediation of the spectacle through separate origins in sound and film. 
When Susan and Gary leave, they pass a tee-shirt depicting Marilyn Monroe. The 
tradition of femininity inscribed in the figure of Madonna includes that represented by 
Monroe, both for physical similarities and for their "ability to embody masculine fantasy" 
(Fiske 1987b, 271) (Madonna's "Material Girl" video is styled upon the "Diamonds are a 
Girl's Best Friend" sequence). The ability to embody a desired characteristic is used to 
empty that characteristic of inherent meaning; since the re-iteration is repetition, the nature 
of the signification originates from the signifying chain and not the female body. The 
image of Madonna/Susan, disseminated through various media in the film, 
recontextualises media symbols of femininity by focussing on their production in the 
Symbolic. 
4.5.2. The Media and Mythical Femininity 
The appropriation and inscription of femininity by the general media is raised from two 
different perspectives, in Desperately Seeking Susan. Roberta is shown in the domestic 
realm performing culinary tasks in synchronisation with Julia Child, a cooking show host 
well known for her iconoclastic behaviour and play upon the glissement of the signifier. 
When Gary enters the kitchen he greets both Roberta and Julia, which makes a statement 
of comparison for the audience between the presence of Julia Child as cooking show host 
in the "natural" setting of the kitchen, and the position of Roberta there, in relation to the 
audience. Gary's greeting is demeaning in the superficial context of the narrative, but the 
relationship of Julia Child to Roberta is problematic in that it raises the point that the 
relationship, to the audience, of Roberta and the media persona manipulated by Julia 
Child is not transparent, in the sense which Julia Child's is for Gary. Stacey (1987) 
limits her interpretation of the kitchen scene to an indication of the difference between 
Susan and Roberta, since Roberta's competence is restricted to her home life, where she 
"manages to synchronise with a televised cooking show, catching up on its dinner 
preparations with confident dexterity in her familiar domestic environment" (1987,60). 
However, the cooking show is not just any show, and Stacey's elision of the nature of 
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Julia Child's show indicates that she accepts the transparency of the film medium, and 
loses the significance of Julia Child's difference from traditional cooking show hosts. 
The film presents the devaluation of women's concerns, as they are trivialised and 
sensationalised in the media, when Gary's sister (Lesley) speculates on Roberta's 
absence being motivated by sexual and personal dissatisfaction with Gary. Lesley is 
rebuked by Larry (Gary's dentist with whom she is acquainted), who asks if the subject 
was revealed to her on Phil Donoghue's chat show. The nature of the media 
representation of women is questioned by the conflicting positions expressed by Larry's 
rebuke: one holds that women are excluded from the scene of their representation (they 
are spoken for), while the other trivialises anything related to women because it may have 
appeared in the public media. 
The media is represented in the film reductively representing objects within the 
closed set of categories through which it simplifies the world. Gary's Oasis 
advertisement promises to satisfy (masculine) fantasies, by using women as decorative 
accessories. The Oasis advertisement is first seen as it is screened on television during a 
party at the Glass's, the occasion coinciding with Roberta's birthday. Roberta does not 
enjoy the advertisement, and gazes at the New York city skyline, while the voice-over 
slogan for the advertisement, "At Gary's Oasis, all your fantasies can come true," is 
heard. When Roberta has lost her memory and is being pursued by Nolan (Bruce's 
accomplice who thinks she is Susan, on the basis of her jacket), she stumbles into the 
office of a security guard and asks for assistance. The guard willingly obliges and in his 
absence Roberta notices the television which is playing in the office. The television 
shows the final moments of a woman performing as spectacle in a classical Hollywood 
musical piece, after which Gary's advertisement begins. The second time the Oasis 
advertisement is played, the voices of the women who call Gary to join them in a spa 
pool are dubbed in Spanish. The dubbing in translation clearly detaches the desire they 
express from an original source, and the assimilation of the advertisement by the movie 
soundtrack places the soundtrack in the same context of mediation. The main text of the 
advertisement is translated into Spanish, but the voice-over slogan remains in English, 
72 
which reveals that the women in the advertisement represent the guarantee of the 
statement, while not being included in the actual enunciation; they have the traditional 
function of naturalising the desire in the message. 
4.6. Classical Narrative Logic 
The production of meaning in cinema is classically defined as a linear phenomenon. 
Heath proposes that this linear movement may be termed "narrativization, the constant 
conversion to narrative, catching up the subject in the image and in the film as its 
narration" (1981, 107); and he further defines narrativization as "the economy of the 
film's flow in a binding coherence, its remembering, the realisation of a single forward 
time within which multiple times can be given play and held" (1981, 109). The linear 
determination of narrative is produced by the assumption that signification is implicitly 
linear. The assumption derives from the Saussurian ascription of the originary possibility 
of language to the spoken utterance, which appears to be a continuous temporal flow. 
The specification of the "forward" aspect implies that the process is also linear, in the 
movement from point to point. Derrida's notion of spacing indicates that signification is 
not linear, so the linear structure Heath suggests for narrative is non-fundamental in the 
formation of meaning in cinema. The classical realist novel, as Barthes shows, and the 
equivalent in mainstream cinema, are interpreted in a linear reading which reinforces the 
narrative structuration around the development of beginning, middle and end. The 
connections between events are minutely specified, in order to establish the chronology 
of events and suggest character development. 
The linear narrative may cite past events or echo passages it has presented earlier in 
its continuum, and these reinforce the metaphorical forward movement. The introduction 
of signifiers which connote parallel signifieds may disrupt the closure of the linear 
reading, and the apparently "non-serious" use of such signifiers, in puns or word games, 
may break the naturalness of the linear reading. The "primary" connections between 
narrative events in Desperately Seeking Susan are disrupted by networks of signifiers, 
and the repetition of signifiers in multiple situations negates the transparency of the film. 
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The narrative presents the word tricks in differing contexts, and uses the pun as an 
example of the glissement of the signifier. The three connotations associated with tricks 
in the film occur in the colloquial, "How's tricks," which Susan uses to greet her friend 
when she is working as magician's assistant; and Lesley provides Gary with an account 
of housewives who have double lives as prostitutes and who "turn tricks in the city" 
while their husbands are at work, at which point in the narrative Roberta is working as 
the magician's assistant, in place of Susan's friend. The signifier provides a network of 
signifieds, and the representation of puns makes the closure of signification in the 
narrative problematic; and narrative itself is thereby deprived of authoritarian closure. 
The film associates Susan with items connoting an Egyptian origin (the earrings, the 
jacket exchanged has a pyramid on its back, like that on the American one dollar bill, and 
the cigarette Roberta takes from Susan's bag and attempts to smoke is one of the Camels 
brand, depicting a pyramid on its packet), and the signifieds originate from the filmic 
writing, exposing the scene of the film as a collection of signifiers for which linearity is a 
secondary phenemenon. The grouping of the Egyptian seme extends across the linear 
organisation of the narrative, so while it helps to define the character of Susan, and 
Roberta's appropriation of her goods, it disrupts the linear development of the 
autonomous characters, and interrupts the narrative isolation of Roberta and Susan as 
"the woman." 
The discovery of a document may classically solve an enigma and allow the narrative 
to take a new turn. Desperately Seeking Susan involves many discoveries but none 
conform to the classical pattern, and contribute to the resistance toward the classification 
of Susan and Roberta as "the woman." When Susan is staying at the Glass's house in 
order to assist Gary find Roberta, she discovers Roberta's diary. The discovery is a 
significant event in the narrative because the diary does not reveal anything about 
Roberta, except that she desires she were desperate (as she comments in the beauty salon 
to a woman who replies that Roberta is the only person she knows who isn't desperate), 
and the messages sent through the newspaper between Jim and Susan. The traditionally 
feminine activity and genre of diary writing is devoid of Roberta's authorial presence, 
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and Susan responds to Gary's comment, that she shouldn't have read another person's 
diary, saying, "It's not about her, it's about me." Among the contents of the diary is the 
photograph taken by Susan in the hotel, which places the item as a symbol outside the 
circulation of signs in the patriarchal economy described by Cook and Johnston. The 
search for Roberta's motivation and inner life results in the dissemination of her original 
identity, and her identity is signified with material which doubles as Susan's, so the 
features of Susan's image in Roberta show that Susan's image is inherently plural and 
transitional, thereby preventing the inscription of a feminine essence. The discovery of 
the diary allows Susan to determine that Roberta may be contacted through the personal 
columns, and she asks Gary why he did not know that. Gary replies that he did not 
think, to which Susan replies, "Fortunately for everybody, I'm here and I'm thinking." 
4.6.1. The Narrativity o/the Gaze 
Mulvey claims that classical narrative is structured around the camera as a masculine 
gaze, which mediates the spectator's gaze, particularly in the objectification of "the 
woman" and in controlling the narrative progression. The gaze in Desperately Seeking 
Susan is generally detached from a specific reference point, and the mechanistic nature of 
the recording is evoked to free it from traditional subjectivist assumptions, and to 
demonstrate that the camera has no inherent specular orientation toward sexual difference. 
Before Roberta arrives in the kitchen scene, the automatic equipment in the kitchen is 
show activating itself. Without the presence of a character, the gaze is not transferable to 
a subjective point of view, so the mediation of the shots is not elided. The position of the 
traditional protagonist as the one with an active presence in the narrative is challenged by 
Roberta's absence and the metaphysics of presence which the notion of the protagonist 
perpetuates are exposed. The automated representation of activities inscribed with natural 
femininity displaces the culturally constructed femininity out of the female body/essence, 
and the programming is non-originary since the procedure is merely the activation of 
repetition; the temporal aspect of its operation subverts the originary presence of the 
signified programming action. 
The segments of the film which are explicitly related to the gaze of one character 
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being directed at another unwitting character are mediated, either mechanically, as when 
Roberta watches Susan through the pay-slot telescope at Battery Park, or such as in the 
mediation of Des's gaze by a fish tank, when he accidently sees Roberta trying on 
Susan's clothes. The mediation of the gaze is an indication that the gaze is a secondary 
phenomenon in cinema, and does not define it, as Mulvey suggests. The camera has no 
objectifying nature inherent in its recording processes, so the cinematic image is 
distinguished from a pure act of seeing, which cannot occur without the mediation of the 
Symbolic. The gaze may be connoted in a shot, although the shot is not fundamentally 
structured as the gaze. 
4.7. The End of the Film 
The conclusion of Desperately Seeking Susan does not conform to the traditional manner 
of demarcation. In a farcical chase sequence, the mistaken identities are exposed and 
Roberta meets Susan when she intervenes in Nolan's attempt to escape with the earrings 
while he holds Susan prisoner. The chase scene develops when the characters converge 
on the Magic Box after Susan places an advertisement requesting that Roberta meet her 
there. The open form of communication is received by all those involved in the pursuit of 
Susan, Roberta and the earrings, and the characters wait in the audience, not knowing 
that Roberta is performing. When Nolan observes that Roberta is wearing one of the 
earrings, he runs onstage and grabs it while she is being sawn in half. When Nolan runs 
backstage and finds Susan and Jim in a sexual embrace, Jim is literally caught with his 
pants down, inverting the situation in the speech act theory which suggests that the 
statement, "I was caught with my pants down," is "heard" in the context which 
naturalises sexual connotations when spoken by a female to a male. Jim is left in the 
position of spectacle, without a predetermined spectator position, and as Nolan takes 
Roberta hostage he appreciates Jim's "nice legs;" the comment undercuts the classical 
position of "the woman" as hostage, since Jim is represented as a sexual spectacle 
alongside Susan. Nolan finds that Susan has the second earring, and, as they climb 
through a window into the dressing room where Roberta is sitting, Susan signals to 
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Roberta to strike Nolan on the head with a bottle, which she does. Susan says, "Good 
going, stranger," in an ambiguous manner, for the tone is one of familiarity, and 
"stranger" is effectively a proper noun, since Roberta signs her advertisement, "A 
Stranger." Roberta murmurs, "Susan," and laughter breaks out between them as Jim 
crashes through the window. In the section which follows the chase sequence, the 
audience may expect that remaining loose threads in the narrative are gathered together 
and the story concluded. However, the continuity is fragmented between the two final 
scenes which follow the chase. 
The penultimate scene occurs in the projection room and auditorium of a cinema, 
where Des works as the projectionist. A science fiction film is screening and parts of its 
dialogue occur in the soundtrack as Roberta enters to tell Des her name in a context where 
he will believe her (she has tried to tell him before), undermining the absolute notion of 
truth and its implication of revelation. In the intruding film narrative, of which shots are 
provided, a group (of men) is attempting to solve the crisis arising from a "bad 
combination" of events, and they consider using androids to avert the attack pending 
from a group of mutants. The androids are machines representing themselves as human, 
while the mutants may be humanoid with an inhuman exterior, and, in relation to the 
confusion of identity and the Symbolic nature of Susan's character, this disrupts the 
context of the final settlement of identity which the conclusion would conventionally 
offer. Roberta and Des kiss, accidentally switching off the projector and the projected 
film is shown melting away. The scene parodies the excessive significance attributed to 
the historically naturalised Hollywood kiss scene and its narrative-halting effect. In a 
shot taken from the position of the screen, Susan and Jim are shown enjoying themselves 
in the audience, at which point Madonna's theme song begins playing; the narrative 
provides another shot of the melted frame being projected onto the screen, and the white 
space is replaced as the final black and white sequence is faded in. 
The black and white segment, accompanied in the soundtrack by "Into the Groove," 
shows Roberta and Susan being presented with a cheque, which they both hold and wave 
above their heads, side by side. The image is then frozen as a photograph and is 
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transferred onto the cover of The Mirror, where it appears under the ambiguous headline, 
"What a pair," along with a photograph of the earrings and a subheadline, "Stolen 
earrings returned." The cover has some text, and titles of stories on other pages: "He'll 
get an F in conduct this time around," and "If I'd had a gun I'd have used it." The titles 
of stories on other pages re-iterate the themes that have been circulating through the film, 
but they do not finally encompass the narrative, while the titles themselves refer outside 
the scope of the narrative, disseminating their point of origin. The story concerning the 
gun evokes desperation, while the, "He'll get an F in conduct ... ," piece re-iterates the 
difference of Desperately Seeking Susan from the traditional cinematic narrative, and the 
non-binary scale makes the grading of the female protagonists, by way of antithetical 
categorisation, impossible. 
In the final photographic image, Roberta and Susan clasp their hands together 
around a cheque, and by joining their arms above their heads they form a phallic symbol. 
The pose is similar to that featuring a single model reflected in a mirror, incorporated by 
Kolbowski in her Model Pleasure, Part Seven (1984); and in Desperately Seeking Susan 
the glass double is evoked by Roberta's surname (Glass). The use of Roberta to replace 
the reflection is not an essentialising gesture, making Roberta and Susan identical, 
because the narrative has signified the irreducible nature of the female protagonists' 
identities. The use of the theme song, to pluralise Madonna's presence in the final 
section, disrupts closure and the notion that she has been captured in the final 
photograph, because it plays across the boundary between sections and into the credits. 
The conversion from colour to monotone is naturalised by the formation of the 
newspaper image in black and white, which is an instance of the signified being 
recontextualised by an appropriated system of representation, and the photograph, which 
the narrative has emptied of transparent meaning, undercuts the position of "the woman" 
as the last point of narrative resistance and locus of truth. The narrative, like 
Kolbowski's project, shows the conflicting use of "the woman" as truth and the bias in 
traditional representation toward what is connoted as masculine desire. Kolbowski 
destabilises representation in general, rather than making an attempt to posit a different 
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"feminine" content in the traditional closure of meaning; similarly, Desperately Seeking 
Susan may be interpreted traditionally as the story of the search for Susan and the 
complication which results when identities are confused and a jewelry theft interlaced. 
However, the narrative representation disrupts such elision of the film medium from the 
signification of the narrative. 
4.8. Representation in Cinema: Conclusions 
The analogical medium of film signifies without a set of categorisable signifiers, which 
indicates that representation is not reducible to a basic autonomous structure. Some film 
theorists attempt to posit signifying structures in cinema, such as the relationship between 
shots, the gaze, stylistic features and narrative conventions. However, none of the 
structures is fundamental. The desire to trace the origin of the signified is elicited by the 
self-effacement of representation, which presents itself as fully present meaning. The 
presence of meaning is not full, however, and is the trace of the erasure of difjerance. 
Theories which focus on specific contexts of meaning may develop those contexts, 
such as the fetishised image and the Mirror Stage, into the privileged locus of meaning, 
which elides the nature of the medium. Although the medium cannot be isolated as a pure 
expressive phenomenon, the cinematic representation of the features investigated by 
psychoanalytic criticism must be accounted for. 
The work of feminist critics who locate their objectives in relation to the nature of 
representation may be more successful than conventional criticism in disrupting the 
traditional closures and erasures which produce the essentialist representation of "the 
woman." Desperately Seeking Susan incorporates material which de stabilises the 
representation of "the woman" by focussing on the nature of the representation, rather 
than on specific theories of meaning. The "presence" of Madonna interrupts the 
traditional narrative closure, since her identity is dis unified by the nature of her 
appearance, and the disjunction between the visual and aural origins of Susan/Madonna, 
in the disco scene and closing sequence, emphasises the film's mediation within the 
Symbolic, and detaches it from the possibility of transparent presentation of an 
unmediated "reality." 
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General Conclusion 
In my examination of representation in contemporary text theory, I find that meaning is 
generally posited in a context which elides mediation. The spoken utterance is the most 
frequently cited context in which meaning is naturalised, and the transparency and 
immediacy of the signified's arrival from its posited origin provides an ideal to which all 
representation is thought to aspire. 
Derrida examines the orientation of Western metaphysics toward the voice as a locus 
of truth and unveiling; following Derrida, my investigation concludes that the idealisation 
of meaning in communication, as the veiled truth, is a common theme which dictates the 
approach to representation in Barthes, Lacan and Western culture in general. 
The autonomy of the privileged scene of representation is disrupted when it is 
shown to have a common origin, in the differential signifying chain. The loss of the 
transparency of meaning, such as in the closure of authorial presence or the figure of "the 
woman," places the text in an indefinable context, which denies the deduction of 
fundamental meaning from representation. As such, representation is not a secondary 
phenomenon, but is the basis from which the nature of the origin is determined. 
The self-veiling trace of differance erases its differential origin by presenting the 
presence of the signified. So, the erasure of mediation may involve both the erasure by 
the signified of its origin, and the erasure of signification in the idealisation of meaning. 
References 
Allen, Robert C. (1987) Channels of Discourse 
London: Methuen 
Barthes, Roland. (1967) Elements of Semiology 
trans. A. Lavers and C. Smith 
New York: Hill and Wang 
(1974) S/Z 
trans. Richard Miller 
New York: Hill and Wang 
(1977) Image Music Text 
trans. Stephen Heath 
London: Fontana Press 
(1978) A Lover's Discourse fragments 
trans. Richard Howard 
New York: Hill and Wang 
(1981a) Camera Lucida 
trans. Richard Howard 
New York: Hill and Wang 
(1981 b) "Textual Analysis of Poe's 'Valdemar'" 
in Young (ed.) (1981), 133-161. 
(1983) Barthes: Selected Writings 
Susan Sontag (ed.) 
London: Fontana Paperbacks 
Brunette, Peter. (1986) "Toward a Deconstructive Theory of Film" 
in Studies in the Literary Imagination 19, 1. 55-71. 
Cook, Pam and Claire Johnston. (1985) "The Place of Woman in the Cinema 
of Raoul Walsh" in Nichols (ed.) (1985), 379-387. 
81 
reprint from Raoul Walsh Philip hardy (ed.) (Colchester: Vineyard Press, 
1974) 
Derrida, Jacques. (1973) Speech and Phenomena and other essays 
on Husserl's theory of signs 
trans. David B. Allison 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press 
(1976) Of Grammatology 
trans. Gayatri Spivak 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 
(1978) Writing and Difference 
trans. Alan Bass 
London: Rouledge and Kegan Paul 
(1982a) Margins 0/ Philosophy 
trans. Alan Bass 
Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press 
(1982b) "Sending: On Representation" in Social Research 49,2. 
294-326. trans. P. and M.A. Caws 
(1987a) The Post Card 
trans. Alan Bass 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
(1987b) Positions 
trans. Alan Bass 
London: The Athlone Press 
Desperately Seeking Susan (Susan Seidelman, U.S.A., 1984) 
Fiske, John. (1987a) Television Culture 
Australia: Methuen 
(1987b) "British Cultural Studies" 
in Allen (ed.) (1987) 
Foucault, MicheL (1977) Language, Counter-Memory, Practice 
trans. D.F. Bouchard and S. Simon 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
Godeau, Abigail. (1984) "Winning the Game When the Rules have been 
Changed: Art Photography and Postmodernism" 
in Screen 25, 6. 88-102. 
(1987) "Living with Contradictions: Critical Practices 
in the Age of Supply-Side Aesthetics" 
in Screen 28,3. 2-22. 
Heath, Stephen. (1981) Questions o/Cinema 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 
Johnson, Barbara. (1981) "The Critical Difference: Balzac's 'Sarrasine' 
and Barthes's SIZ " 
in Young (ed.) (1981) 162-174. 
Kolbowski, Sylvia. (1982) Model Pleasure II, in Godeau (1984), 100. 
(1983) Model Pleasure, Part 5, in Godeau (1987), 9. 
(1984) Model Pleasure, Part 7, in Wallis (ed.) (1984), 390. 
Lacan, Jacques. (1968) The Language of the Self 
trans. Anthony Wilden 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 
82 
(1977) Ecrits: a selection 
trans. Alan Sheridan 
London: Tavistock Publications 
(1979) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 
trans. Alan Sheridan 
Hannondsworth: Penguin 
Mast, Gerald and Marshall Cohen. (1985) Film Theory and Criticism (3rd ed) 
New York: Oxford University Press 
Metz, Christian. (1985) "from The Imaginary Signifier" 
in Mast and Cohen (eds.) (1985), 782-802. 
reprint from Screen 16,2. 
Moi, ToriI. (1985) Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory 
London: Methuen & Co. Ltd 
Mulvey, Laura. (1985) "Visual Pleasure in Narrative Cinema" 
in Nichols (ed.) (1985), 303-315. reprint from Screen 16,3 (1975) 
Nichols, Bill. (ed.) (1985) Movies and Methods II 
Berkerley: University of California Press 
de Saussure, Ferdinand. (1959) Course in General Linguistics 
trans. Wade Baskin 
New York: Philosophical Library 
Stacey, Jackie. (1987) "Desperately Seeking Difference" 
in Screen 28,1. 48-61. 
Wallis, Brian. (ed.) (1984) Art After Modernism 
New York: New Museum of Contemporary Art 
Young, Robert. (ed.) (1981) Untying the Text 
Boston: Routledge Kegan Paul 
83 
